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Dear Colleagues,
We are pleased to share with you Renewing Juvenile Justice, the first report to emerge from our exploration into juvenile 
justice and foster care systems in California. Our inquiry in these areas was prompted by the strong relationship between 
the institutional health — policy, practice, fiscal and culture — of child-serving systems at the county level and their 
capacity to generate positive outcomes for the youth they serve.
Californians are well aware of the looming budget challenges that are forcing the state and local jurisdictions to rethink 
how public services are delivered. Recently, Gov. Jerry Brown proposed a significant shift in juvenile justice policy  
long called for by children and family advocates — closing the state’s youth prisons and shifting that oversight to the  
counties. While the proposal was revised, it is clear that counties will be asked to do more with fewer resources.  
We believe now is the time to reacquaint ourselves with the history and evolution of these systems while, for largely 
budgetary reasons, we contemplate their devolution and redesign.
This report, commissioned by Sierra Health Foundation and written by our partners at the Center on Juvenile and 
Criminal Justice, offers recommendations for policy changes to improve practice in local jurisdictions and expand 
services for high-risk youthful offenders. We take this position acknowledging the importance of a caveat offered by a 
colleague who reviewed a final draft of the report: Juvenile justice systems should only engage youth who, in fact, need 
to be engaged. We concur. Accordingly, we have worked to align the report with the complex history that led to the 
creation of juvenile justice systems — to support the social, emotional and physical development of young people by 
providing the appropriate type and amount of rehabilitative treatment necessary to position them to take advantage  
of opportunities that promote long-term personal and professional success. Many of the practices mentioned in  
Renewing Juvenile Justice are gleaned from other juvenile justice reform efforts, including the Annie E. Casey  
Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative and The California Endowment’s Healthy Returns Initiative. 
Where we think we offer innovation is in the idea of tapping into available funding resources to expand services for 
high-risk young people.  
In this time of uncertainty — not knowing what California public systems will look like in the future — we offer  
this policy report with the expectation that it will be a helpful tool for local jurisdictions and philanthropic partners  
interested in reshaping and ultimately renewing juvenile justice practice in California. The end goal for our collective 
work is to ensure all young people have an opportunity to lead healthy lives and reach their full potential — a laudable 
purpose and one that we believe we all should be willing to support.  
Sincerely,
Chet P. Hewitt 
President and CEO 
Sierra Health Foundation
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The Center on Juvenile and Criminal  
Justice (CJCJ) was commissioned by Sierra 
Health Foundation to critically examine Cali-
fornia’s juvenile justice system and consider 
the potential role of foundations in promoting 
systemic reform. The information gathered 
by CJCJ researchers for this report suggests 
that foundations can perform a key leader-
ship role in juvenile justice by assisting  
counties in their efforts to develop a broader 
array of interventions, especially for special-
needs youth. The treatment needs of  
special-needs youth, particularly the men-
tally ill, are a primary challenge for county 
juvenile justice systems, especially when it 
comes to accessing services and funding 
streams across jurisdictional, institutional 
and administrative boundaries. Despite the 
current statewide economic crisis, many 
counties continue to underutilize resources 
and funding streams that could diversify their 
treatment service, bolster resources and 
improve the quality of care. In addition, the 
need to develop data gathering and man-
agement information systems is present in 
many California juvenile justice systems.  
As the Annie E. Casey Foundation has found 
through its nationwide Juvenile Detention 
Alternatives Initiative (JDAI), measurable 
change cannot occur without the consistent 
gathering of accurate data that informs  
management and drives policy.
In developIng the recommendatIons contained in  
this report, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice researchers 
examined the evolution of California’s juvenile justice system from its 
origins in the 1850s through the creation of the juvenile court in 1903 
to the tumultuous events of the past decade. CJCJ has attempted to 
provide a comprehensive historical account that illustrates the origins 
of today’s issues and provides a direction for establishing a model 21st 
century juvenile justice system for California.  
Site visits to selected counties revealed a high level of commitment  
to quality care among California’s juvenile justice professionals. In 
some instances, California counties offer a model for not just the state, 
but the nation. However, our research also revealed vast discrepancies 
and disparities within county systems. As a result, youth residing in 
certain counties do not have access to the same level of services as 
youth in other counties. We believe that based on this analysis, foun-
dations can promote the development of a coherent and consistent 
level of juvenile justice care throughout California. We recommend 
that foundations focus their resources in assisting counties to develop 
behavioral health-oriented services that target the highest-need youth. 
Demonstrating successful strategies with this most challenging popula-
tion promotes systemic reform by changing long-term assumptions 
and practices about appropriate interventions. Eliminating the  
disparity in treatment for youth in the juvenile justice system will  
create better outcomes and improve the health of the communities  
in which they reside.
Due to the state’s dire budget situation, counties will be asked to 
absorb more oversight of youthful offenders. This change offers a rare 
opportunity for foundations to exercise a sizable influence on juvenile 
justice practice for the 21st century.
 Executive Summary
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From our research, CJCJ identified the 
following areas for immediate assistance. 
recommendation 1. Assist counties in the devel-
opment of uniform management information systems 
designed to collect and analyze data at all stages of the 
juvenile justice system, including arrest, intake, detention 
hearing, adjudication, disposition and post disposition.
Foundations could fund the development and imple-
mentation of a single system that would assist counties in 
collecting better information to enhance administrative  
effectiveness and allow comparison between jurisdictions. 
Foundations could work with selected counties to pilot 
a model system and then work with the state legislature, 
county associations and juvenile justice advocates to  
establish a statewide system. Such a system could be  
developed in partnership or in consultation with the  
Annie E. Casey Foundation, which has pioneered the 
development of comprehensive juvenile justice data  
collection systems. During the site visits conducted  
for the development of this report, probation officials 
consistently cited the need to improve data collection  
and management information systems.
recommendation 2. Assist counties in the develop-
ment of a uniform screening and assessment process to 
determine the mental health needs of youth entering the 
juvenile justice system.
One of the biggest deficiencies within the juvenile justice 
system is the absence of full uniform access to available 
mental health services. The first step in determining 
needed services requires the development of an effective 
screening system. 
The screening 
process simply 
involves making 
a preliminary 
determination 
as to whether a 
youth is in need 
of a full mental health assessment. The initial screening is 
a form of “triage” that is provided during the early stages 
of the adjudication process and can be conducted by  
line staff.
If the screening suggests that the youth is in need of a 
full assessment, the youth is referred to a licensed men-
tal health professional. The assessment process utilizes a 
formal instrument that allows the mental health specialist 
to make a preliminary diagnosis and recommendation 
for treatment. During this assessment stage, it also can 
be determined if the youth is eligible for federally funded 
mental health services.
recommendation 3. Assist counties in developing 
full capacity for accessing and utilizing federally funded 
mental health services.
One of the largest service deficiencies in the California 
juvenile justice system is the underutilization of federal 
mental health service funding streams. The main federal 
program available to California juvenile justice systems  
is the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treat-
ment (EPSDT) program that is provided through Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act. EPSDT services can fund 
an entire range of comprehensive mental health services 
and supportive interventions that are typically unavail-
able to juvenile justice system youth. Also, up to 50% of 
EPSDT services are federally funded, and another 45% 
are funded by the state, leaving only the remaining 5%  
to the counties.
recommendation 4. Assist counties with the develop-
ment and implementation of wraparound services.
Wraparound services rank among the major innovations 
in the human services field over the past 25 years. The 
practice is based on blending different categorical funding 
streams to create a flexible array of individualized services. 
Under current California law, youth can be eligible to 
receive wraparound services if they have medical necessity 
and are in a high-level group-home placement or are in 
danger of being committed to out-of-home placement. 
These youth are generally the most service-needy youth 
in the juvenile justice system. Unlike traditional residen-
tial care, wraparound services emphasize community and 
family-based interventions that are designed according 
to the individual needs of the youth. Because of flexible 
funding, counties and service providers can purchase 
services from existing vendors, provide basic family needs 
and employ nontraditional resources.
triage is the sorting of patients 
(as in an emergency room) according 
to the urgency of their need for care.
http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/triage
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Presently, the development of wraparound requires the 
cooperation of mental health, probation and social  
service departments. Because of the different professional  
agendas and mandates of these county agencies, few 
probation departments have fully developed their wrap-
around capacity. In instances where counties allow access 
to wraparound services for juvenile justice system youth, 
the services often are underutilized.
Wraparound and EPSDT services have the potential to 
promote substantial systemic change by creating and 
expanding comprehensive interventions and support 
services to high-needs delinquent youth. Such approaches 
to service delivery offer a counter to the traditional juve-
nile justice system approach that emphasizes supervision 
and sanctions. San Francisco, Santa Cruz and Humboldt 
counties are pioneering methods for delivering wrap-
around services to juvenile justice-involved youth and  
can serve as models for other counties.
recommendation 5. Improve institutional practices 
at the county level.
With the decline of the state’s youth correctional system, 
counties will need to develop long-term secure options. 
Because of institutional expansion at the county level 
over the past 10 years, county juvenile justice facilities are 
better designed to handle a more serious population than 
the large state correctional institutions. Facilities built 
over the past decade have modern designs that facilitate 
supervision and separation. In contrast, all of the state’s 
youth correctional institutions, with the exception of one, 
are more than 40 years old, poorly designed and in a state 
of severe deterioration. The California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) estimates that it 
will cost more than $200 million to renovate the present 
DJJ facilities and return them to minimal operational 
standards — a prohibitive cost that likely influenced  
Gov. Brown’s decision to close or further downsize  
the system.
Recent reports by the Little Hoover Commission, the 
Legislative Analyst’s Office and CJCJ have urged the  
creation of regional secure facilities that could accommo-
date special-needs youth within designated geographical 
areas to replace the state-run institutions. An example  
of a regional facility is Humboldt County’s New  
Horizon’s program, which provides specialized mental 
health services in a secure environment for Northern 
California counties. Other regional facilities could be 
designed to accommodate other special populations, such 
as sex offenders and substance abusers.
The shift to reliance on county-based secure facilities 
provides an opportunity to create an integrated and coor-
dinated continuum of interventions and services, with the 
state assuming an oversight role to establish, monitor and 
enforce county standards throughout California. Under 
this recommendation, foundations could provide techni-
cal assistance and support to counties seeking to improve 
or modify institutional treatment and assist with the 
development of regional-based facilities to supplant the 
need for state institutions.
With the decline in the use of state correctional institu-
tions, California counties must develop shared strategies 
and approaches that can address the high-needs youth 
who were once committed to the state. Because of the 
state’s tradition of strong county government, many 
jurisdictions have made enormous strides in developing 
innovative approaches that rival the best systems  
nationally. The challenge for juvenile justice reform in 
California is to identify these best practices and promote 
and assist their adoption throughout the state. Counties 
such as Santa Cruz, Humboldt, San Francisco and Santa 
Clara have developed highly innovative practices in the 
areas of secure care treatment and community-based 
interventions, serving as models for other counties.
The recommendations outlined in this report represent 
practical, targeted and highly achievable reforms in which 
foundations can have a significant impact. While compre-
hensive juvenile justice reform is a long-term endeavor, 
this report highlights the initial steps that will usher in a 
new era of practice and philosophy. The CJCJ board and 
staff thank Sierra Health Foundation for giving us the 
opportunity to work on this very important issue. We 
also want to acknowledge The California Endowment’s 
Healthy Returns Initiative, which supported many of the 
county innovations highlighted in this report. 
1In this report, Center on Juvenile and  
Criminal Justice (CJCJ) researchers  
provide an overview of the California  
juvenile justice system and important issues 
relevant to fashioning reform. To highlight 
the complexities and variations of juvenile 
justice practices, CJCJ’s research team 
constructed statistical indicators that allow 
comparison between different counties. With 
these statistical indicators, the authors were 
able to examine county variations in areas 
of institutional reliance and non-institutional 
care. The report is premised on the growing 
recognition within the juvenile justice and 
human service field that institutional care 
should be the option of last resort, and that 
reliance on institutional care often is reflec-
tive of a jurisdiction’s failure to develop a  
full range of interventions and services 
(Greenwood, 1983).
In the past three decades, new and innovative approaches 
to the treatment of children under the care of the juvenile justice 
system have evolved throughout California and the United States. 
These new approaches have altered the assumptions and historical 
practices that have characterized the juvenile justice system since its 
inception. This includes breaking the artificial barriers that divide 
the various service elements necessary in meeting the child’s needs. 
These barriers often are related to how service systems are structured 
based on functional disciplines such as juvenile justice, child welfare, 
mental health and education. As these specialized functions evolved 
over time, their ability to work in unison quickly dissipated into a 
morass of bureaucratic impediments. Although high percentages of 
youth in the juvenile justice system suffer from a diagnosable dis-
ability or require special educational services, these services often are 
denied because county mental health and education departments do 
not prioritize the needs of juvenile justice system youth. Instead, they 
often are viewed as no longer their concern. For many years it was 
an unwritten practice within many child welfare systems to transfer 
youth to the juvenile justice system once they reached a certain age 
and began to display troublesome behaviors (Miller, 1998).
As a result of historic bureaucratic impediments to services in the 
past, juvenile justice systems in California often have fallen short of 
full success. Routine practices tended to offer little more than release 
to the home with limited follow-up, or commitment to residential 
care or an institutional setting. These practices do not adequately  
address family or neighborhood issues that are normally the root 
cause of delinquent behavior (Greenwood, 1983).
On a positive note, over the past 15 years, California probation 
services have expanded and improved as state and federal subsidies 
became available. For example, the passage of the California Juvenile 
Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) in 2000 provided more than 
$120 million annually in county subsidies to improve probation  
supervision and augment specialized services (Commonweal Institute, 
2010). In addition to the JJCPA funds, county probation  
departments have received additional monies through the Federal  
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and the state’s 
Introduction
2Youthful Offender Block Grant (YOBG). These funds 
played an important role in advancing juvenile justice 
probation services during the past decade. Unfortunately, 
due to the state’s budget crisis, the future of these funds 
remains uncertain (D. Steinhart, personal communica-
tion, June 15, 2010).
In addition to the creation of the Youthful Offender 
Block Grant in 2007, the passage of Senate Bill 81 drasti-
cally changed the nature of juvenile probation services in 
California by extending jurisdiction. County probation 
departments now can provide a full range of services  
to juvenile justice youth up to the age of 21. Despite  
these major changes in the law, probation departments  
continue to struggle to provide services to their traditional 
populations and few have engaged in any major efforts to 
expand services beyond the 18th birthday (D. Steinhart, 
personal communication, June 15, 2010).
The other momentous change in the California juvenile 
justice system over the past decade has been the demise  
of what was formerly known as the California Youth  
Authority (CYA). The demise of the CYA is the result of 
the Farrell litigation, a lawsuit that revealed deeply rooted 
deficiencies and abusive practices within the 119-year-old 
system. As a result of the widespread recognition of the 
system’s failures, California counties drastically curtailed 
commitments to state youth correctional institutions 
and have relied on local facilities or residential placement 
(Macallair and Males, 2006).
Finally, the past 15 years have witnessed an unprecedent-
ed decline in youth crime in California. As a result, youth 
crime rates are now at a 40-year low. This youth crime 
decline provides a rare opportunity to restructure juvenile 
justice services to target the highest-needs youth. High-
needs youth are typically those who exhibit the broadest 
range of social, psychological and economic challenges. 
This population represents the juvenile justice system’s 
greatest challenge and its greatest historical failure. If the 
juvenile justice system is to achieve its intended purpose 
of rehabilitation, its limited services must focus on 
the most challenging population. Research shows that 
targeting services to the most challenging and highest-
risk youth reaps the greatest benefits in reducing future 
criminality (Latessa and Lowenkamp, 2006).
This report provides a critical historical and contempo-
rary overview of the California juvenile justice system.  
Establishing a foundation agenda that will create a  
juvenile justice system for the 21st century requires an 
understanding of the system’s evolution and present chal-
lenges. Founded on casework and institutional practice 
often rooted in the 19th century, the current juvenile 
justice system as presently constituted in most California 
counties is not designed to meet the multifaceted chal-
lenges of the 21st century. Instead, juvenile justice  
services often are fragmented and limited by the dictates 
of categorical funding streams. Interventions tend to rely 
on punitive measures that exclude family involvement 
and are isolated from the daily realities of a youth’s life.
Meeting the challenges of the 21st century requires the 
development of a coordinated continuum of juvenile 
justice services that emphasizes partnerships among 
public sector agencies, community-based organizations 
and nontraditional community supports. Within this 
model, public sector juvenile justice agencies assume 
greater responsibility for developing, monitoring, evaluat-
ing and scrutinizing the delivery of services by nonpublic 
sector organizations and assume a reduced role in the 
actual delivery of services. By emphasizing the develop-
ment of a broad range of coordinated community-based 
options, juvenile justice systems reduce their reliance on 
institutional care and create a system designed to achieve 
long-term results.
3   s e c t I o n  I 
Historical Overview of  
Juvenile Justice in California
In order to understand the present state of 
California’s juvenile justice system and to 
establish the best path for reform, it is vital 
to examine its origins. The system originally 
grew out of the philanthropic ideals of the 
19th century child savers, who sought to 
better the lives of disenfranchised children. 
Services expanded quickly into unwieldy, 
punitive, institution-based care that did little 
to separate neglected or orphaned children 
from delinquent children, and were plagued 
with scandal and abuse. Out of dissatis-
faction with this system, the fostering and 
probation systems began in the late 19th  
century, as did the juvenile court. Although 
these systems served to mitigate some 
problems, evolving, expanding and improv-
ing with the times, incarceration in the large 
criminogenic congregate care institutions 
that had been created remained a common 
outcome for troubled youth. Due to advo-
cacy and the Farrell lawsuit, detailing the 
abuses of state facilities, recent years have 
seen a marked shift toward county-level  
services for juvenile offenders and toward 
more rehabilitative services.
Section I includes research on the following topics:
• The 19th century roots of juvenile justice in California
• The creation of the foster care system, probation and the juvenile court
• The creation of the former California Youth Authority, now known as  
the Division of Juvenile Justice
• The Farrell litigation and the following consent decree
• The future of the Division of Juvenile Justice
San Francisco Industrial 
School inmates
today’s calIfornIa juvenIle justIce system is rooted 
in the philanthropic efforts of the 19th century child savers. The child 
savers were individuals and organizations who sought to improve 
the plight of orphaned, abused, neglected and delinquent children, 
primarily through institutionalized care. The first institution designed 
exclusively for destitute and delinquent children was the New York 
House of Refuge (HOR) established in 1825. The HOR quickly 
became a movement, and its institutional design was the model for 
subsequent institutions (Macallair, 2003).
The institutions were intended to imbue young charges with sound 
work habits, an elementary education, religious virtue and respect 
for authority. The daily regimen was harsh and unyielding. Children, 
regardless of their condition in life, were subjected to a daily routine  
of hard labor and severe punishment. There was little to distinguish 
the treatment of poor misfortunate children in these institutions to  
treatment given to adult criminals sentenced to the penitentiary  
(Macallair, 2003).
These 19th century institutional prac-
tices reflected the prevailing belief of the 
day, that structure and discipline were 
more important than nurturing and 
compassion. The brutal treatment to 
which children were subject became a 
frequent point of conflict and criticism 
within the child saving movement that 
ultimately led to the development of 
new approaches, which did not rely on  
4institutional care. These new approaches included  
“placing-out” or “home-visiting,” and were the  
forerunners to today’s foster care and probation  
(Macallair, 2003).
The first California institution for destitute and delin-
quent children was the San Francisco Industrial School, 
which was created by statute in 1858. Hailed as an  
example of the state’s progress, the Industrial School 
reflected the prevailing institutional model of the day 
(Macallair, 2003).1 
For the next 30 years, the Industrial School was the  
subject of constant scandals over abusive treatment of  
children in its care, including long-term confinement in 
dark cells and a near starvation diet (Macallair, 2003). 
When it finally closed in 1892, one San Francisco newspa-
per proclaimed in a banner headline, “WIPED OUT AT  
LAST: THE SAN FRANCISCO INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL 
PASSES INTO HISTORY. LONG DENOUNCED BY  
THE CITY’S JUDICIARY AS A NURSERY OF CRIME”  
(“Wiped Out at Last,” 1891).
Dissatisfaction with institutional care as represented by  
the Industrial School gave rise to a flurry of new child  
care approaches in the mid-19th century. Among the 
most significant was the San Francisco Boys and Girls Aid 
Society, which was founded in 1874. The San Francisco 
Boys and Girls Aid Society began in a home donated by 
railroad magnate Charles Crocker (Macallair, 2003).
Initially, they provided a safe place 
where homeless children could 
have a meal and enjoy a respite 
from street life. Later the society 
introduced two innovations that 
eventually would become pillars of 
the modern juvenile justice system. 
The first was the placing-out  
system, where abused, neglected 
and destitute children were  
removed from their natural  
parents, placed on trains and sent 
to rural California counties, where 
they were placed with rural farm 
families. The practice was borrowed from the Children’s 
Aid Society of New York, where it was first introduced by 
the pioneering child saver Charles Loring Brace in 1853. 
Placing-out provided the foundation for today’s foster 
care system (Macallair, 2003).
The other area first pioneered in California by the San 
Francisco Boys and Girls Aid Society was the passage of 
the state’s first probation act in 1883. After heavy lob-
bying from the Boys and Girls Aid Society and other 
California child savers, the state legislature established 
a system that allowed counties to pay for the placement 
of youth with philanthropic agencies as an alternative 
to committing youth to the Industrial School. The act 
represented the first step toward the creation of today’s 
probation system and modern-day group homes  
(Macallair, 2003).
San Francisco Industrial School
Boys and Girls Aid Society Crocker House
1 In 1861, California opened an ill-fated second institution in Marysville. This institu-
tion was short-lived as the state ordered its closure seven years later, succumbing to a 
poor location, high costs and insufficient referrals. The youth housed at the time were 
transferred to the Industrial School.
5Despite the development of 
community-based alternatives to 
institutional commitments, the 
state did not abandon the congre-
gate institutional model with the 
closing of the Industrial School.  
In 1889, the California legislature 
authorized the establishment of 
two state-run reform schools in 
Whittier and Ione. These two 
institutions, the Whittier State 
School and the Preston School 
of Industry, became mainstays 
of California’s youth correctional 
system up to the present day. The 
Whittier State School operated until 
its closure in 2005, while the Preston School of Industry 
remains one of the main youth correctional facilities in 
the state (Lafferty, 1997; Mihailoff, 2005; Nunn and 
Cleary, 2004).
The Juvenile Court
In 1899, arguably the most important event in establish-
ing the role of the state as the ultimate protector of the 
orphaned, destitute and delinquent occurred in Illinois 
with the passage of the nation’s first juvenile court act.2   
Four years later in 1903, California became one of the 
first states to follow suit, when it established its own 
juvenile court modeled on the Illinois law. Initially, only 
San Francisco, Alameda and Los Angeles counties were 
included, but the following year the law was amended  
to include all 58 California counties (Nunn and  
Cleary, 2004).
By designating children as a separate and distinct class 
subject to a new system of jurisprudence, the juvenile 
court extended the power and authority of the state to  
intervene in the lives of a growing number of children. 
The juvenile court was intended to be a place where 
children would receive individualized attention in a 
nonjudgmental paternalistic manner. Borrowing from 
the emerging field of social work, the new juvenile court 
system required trained and professional staff to achieve 
its vision and goals (Schlossman, 2005).
This need for a trained professional to implement the  
juvenile court’s agenda of individualized treatment gave 
rise to the probation profession. Initially, juvenile pro-
bation officers were either volunteers or employed by 
nonprofit organizations assigned to the juvenile court. 
However, as it became evident that a functional juvenile 
court system required a full-time professional staff, the 
California legislature amended the juvenile court law in 
1909 to authorize the hiring of probation officers as  
official agents of the state (Schlossman, 2005).
Probation officers working under the auspices of the 
juvenile court were expected to serve as the court’s neutral 
agents. Their roles included conducting background 
investigations and compiling reports for the courts with 
individualized recommendations. Once the court deter-
mined the appropriate intervention, it then became the 
responsibility of the probation officer to implement the 
judge’s order. This required probation officers to be the 
primary provider of services if the youth was returned to 
the community. If a youth was placed on probation and 
released to the community, the probation officer’s primary 
function was to supervise the youth and ensure adherence 
to all release conditions. If the youth violated the  
conditions of release, the probation officer also served  
Preston School of Industry
2 An Act to Regulate the Treatment and Control of Dependent, Neglected and  
Delinquent Children (Illinois Legislature 1899).
6a law enforcement function with the authority to  
return the youth to custody (Nunn and Cleary, 2004;  
Schlossman, 2005).
With the passage of the 1909 amended act, one other 
component was added to the California juvenile court— 
the requirement that all counties maintain detention 
homes for youth under juvenile court jurisdiction. This 
promoted another important vision of the early court 
— the removal of children from adult prisons and jails. 
Throughout the 19th century, it was common for  
children throughout California to be confined in adult  
facilities pending a court hearing, and be sentenced to 
adult prison if convicted of a felony. In fact, at the time 
the juvenile court law was passed, more than 300 inmates 
at San Quentin were under the age of 16 (Nunn and 
Cleary, 2004; Schlossman, 2005). The young man  
in the photo below was age 13 when he entered San  
Quentin in 1905. This practice was widely condemned 
and viewed as destructive throughout the 19th century.
The requirement that all counties maintain a detention 
home (juvenile hall) drastically changed the course of 
California’s child welfare and delinquency policy. Because 
detention homes were expensive, they absorbed a dispro-
portionate amount of the resources that could otherwise 
fund non-institutional care. Although the California 
juvenile court law was considered a progressive step 
forward, by the 1940s California had the highest juvenile 
detention rates in the country, with many counties indis-
criminately housing abused and neglected children with 
delinquents (California Youth Authority, 1981; Norman 
and Allen, 1954).
The System Evolves
With counties assuming the primary burden for provid-
ing juvenile court services, probation went through a 
period of rapid expansion and quickly became the most 
important element of the juvenile justice system. Among 
the services probation officers provided to the courts was 
the conducting of background investigations to deter-
mine the conditions in which the child lived and the 
root causes of his/her behavior. Once this information 
was gathered it was presented to a juvenile court judge. 
At that point, an informal hearing was held in which the 
judge made a decision as to the child’s fate. The original 
purpose of the juvenile court was to avoid any trappings 
of a criminal court proceeding. Because the court was to 
function in the child’s best interest, no due process pro-
tections were considered necessary. Besides the judge, the 
only people present in a California juvenile court  
hearing were the child, the parents and the probation 
officer. The probation officer served as the neutral agent 
of the court and was expected to act as both the child’s 
advocate and accuser (Nunn and Cleary, 2004; Schloss-
man, 2005; Tanenhaus, 2004).
The absence of a formal hearing and uniform procedures 
led to vast disparities in how children were treated. 
Without due process protections, treatment for similarly 
situated children varied widely from judge to judge and 
county to county. In addition, even though all 58 coun-
ties were operating under the same set of statutes, how 
13-year-old San Quentin inmate
7the laws were interpreted varied with each jurisdiction. As 
a result, some county juvenile courts sent large numbers 
of youths to the state-run youth correctional institutions, 
such as Preston and Whittier, while others did not (Nunn 
and Cleary, 2004; Mihailoff, 2005).
Regardless of county variations in commitments to state 
institutions, California probation practices evolved in a 
similar manner. With the necessity to maintain detention 
centers, county probation systems often were slow to de-
velop non-institutional options. Throughout most of the 
20th century, California probation departments struggled 
to develop intervention options that would allow the 
attainment of the individualized treatment goal. Instead, 
probation practice tended to rely on a narrow range of 
county and state options that typically relied on some 
form of institutionalization and minimum community-
based services (Norman and Allen, 1954; Brozek, 1985).
The emphasis on institutionalization continued with the 
development of county ranches and camps in the 1940s. 
Born from the work camp models developed during the 
New Deal, such as the Works Project Administration and 
Civilian Conservation Corps, many California probation 
departments implemented what became known as 
ranches and camps. These facilities were administered 
by county probation departments as post-disposition 
minimum-security training schools. Often located in 
remote areas, probation ranches and camps followed a 
classic training school design with large open dormitories 
and a regimented daily routine. Ranches and camps were 
considered last stops before a commitment to a state  
institution (Teeters and Reinemann, 1950).
From the inception of the juvenile court, judges retained 
the option of committing youth to the state institutions. 
Until the 1940s, there were three state-administered 
youth correctional institutions—the Fred G. Nelles 
School in Whittier (1892), the Preston School of  
Industry (1894) and the Ventura School for Girls (1916). 
All three institutions were swirled in controversy at 
regular intervals since their opening, despite the state’s 
periodic efforts to improve their management or upgrade 
the facilities. By the end of the 1930s, disillusionment 
with youth correction institutions had become wide-
spread throughout the nation. In California, concerns 
in many counties over reliance on state institutions and 
the absence of adequate probation services led to calls for 
reform (Mihailoff, 2005).
Borrowing from a model promulgated by the nationally 
renowned American Law Institution, Gov. Culbert Olson 
argued for the creation of a new entity that would reduce 
rates of institutional commitments, primarily by im-
proving the functioning of local probation departments. 
In 1941, Olson signed into law the Youth Corrections 
Authority Act, creating a new state agency to:
Protect society more effectively by substituting for 
retributive punishment, methods of training and treat-
ment directed toward the correction and rehabilitation 
of the young persons found guilty of violating the law.
The original purpose of the new agency was to develop 
better systems of assessment and diagnosis for the purpose 
of promoting individualized care. These new assessment 
techniques then would be shared with local officials and 
applied at the county level. This original vision quickly 
succumbed to unforeseen 
events (Mihailoff, 2005).
In 1942, the state train-
ing schools became 
embroiled in controversy 
following the suicides of 
two young men at Whit-
tier, followed by a similar 
tragedy at Preston. The 
controversy surrounding 
these events gave rise to 
allegations of staff culpa-
bility in the death of at least one of these young men. As 
a result of these scandals and the continuing frustration 
over conditions in the state institutions, the newly elected 
Gov. Earl Warren altered the original purpose of the 
Youth Corrections Authority and ordered the new agency 
to assume responsibility for managing the three state-run 
institutions (Mihailoff, 2005; Brozek, 1985; Nunn and 
Cleary, 2004).
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new agency was to develop 
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8The new agency was called the California Youth Author-
ity (CYA) and was given a mandate to centralize the 
management of what had been semi-autonomous state 
institutions. State officials believed that a more modern 
centralized style of management finally would bring an 
end to decades of scandals and abuse. Over the succeeding 
three decades, the CYA would attempt to develop some  
of the most sophisticated and innovative institutional 
practices ever devised in a youth corrections system  
(Mihailoff, 2005; McVicar, 1973).
In addition to developing a new system of institution-
based rehabilitation, the new CYA was burdened with 
the enormous administrative challenge of meeting the 
increased demand for institutional beds during the 
post-World War II 
era. As the California 
population surged, the 
CYA population grew, 
consuming more and 
more agency time and 
resources (Mihailoff, 
2005; McVicar, 1973).
As institutional 
populations expanded, 
conditions deteriorat-
ed, despite the CYA’s 
internationally rec-
ognized efforts to pioneer new techniques of institution-
based diagnostic instruments and rehabilitation. Efforts to 
improve treatment of youth did not succeed in repairing 
an institutional life characterized by violence, deprivation 
and alienation. The daily experience for youth in a CYA 
institution was one where the strong and sophisticated 
exploited the weak and vulnerable, a condition the staff 
could do little to prevent (Mihailoff, 2005; McVicar, 
1973).
The failure of the CYA to improve the daily reality of 
institutional life led former director Heman G. Stark to 
conclude in 1961 that institutional care was a failure  
and that a new direction would need to be taken  
(Mihailoff, 2005).
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, many counties contin-
ued to send a high number of youth to state institutions, 
prompting state officials to seek new alternatives.  
The concerns being raised were based on the belief  
that the decision by county probation departments to  
recommend commitment to the CYA was based more on  
bureaucratic convenience than necessity. It was simply 
easier to commit a youth to the state since the county 
would no longer have to bear the financial or managerial 
burden (Mihailoff, 2005).
To address the problem of county commitment dispar-
ity and reduce the need for the additional institutional 
beds, the state launched a pioneering initiative in 1965 
with the Probation Subsidy Act. Probation subsidy was 
based on the theory that commitment to state institutions 
could be reduced by providing county probation depart-
ments with financial incentives to maintain youth at the 
local level (Smith, 1986; Nieto, 1996).
Between the years 1965 to 1976, county CYA commit-
ments declined substantially for the first time in two 
decades as counties expanded probation services, reduc-
ing their reliance on state correctional institutions. The 
decline in commitments resulted in the closure of three 
CYA institutions (Smith, 1986; Lerman, 1975).
Probation subsidy occurred at a time of national consen-
sus around the benefits of community-based correctional 
interventions (Smith, 1986; Lerman, 1975). This novel 
experiment has been widely replicated around the coun-
try in the four decades since it was first introduced.3
Despite the probation subsidy’s success, it came under 
fire from conservative critics and law enforcement inter-
est groups for promoting leniency in the treatment of 
juvenile offenders. The attacks on the program centered 
on the state incentive payments to counties to main-
tain youth at the local level. Often derisively referred 
to as blood money, the probation subsidy program was 
replaced with a system of direct county payments that 
carried no mandates to reduce correctional commitments 
(Smith, 1986; Lerman, 1975).
By the 1980s, the once progressive California juvenile 
justice system was taken over by a conservative tide that 
swept away the reform efforts of the past. As many coun-
ties fell back on harsh practices, more and more juveniles 
3 The most recent manifestation of the probation subsidy was in the state of Ohio under 
the leadership of Republican Gov. George Voinovich. The program was called Reclaim 
Ohio and also used the strategy of subsidizing counties for not committing youth to 
state correctional institutions.
By the 1980s, the once  
progressive California 
juvenile justice system was 
taken over by a conserva-
tive tide that swept away 
the reform efforts of  
the past. 
9were committed to state institutions. This increase in 
state institutionalization was not uniform as the state 
returned to old patterns of vast county disparities. An 
analysis of commitment practices within Sierra Health 
Foundation’s 26 counties demonstrates this historical 
county-by-county institutional commitment disparity.
By 1995, the population of the CYA reached a historical 
high, with nearly 10,000 youth crammed into 11 large 
training schools designed for a total capacity of just 6,722 
(Division of the Youth Authority, 1995). A major reason 
for this population growth was the number of counties 
that were committing large numbers of youth to the 
CYA. This practice had severe and tragic consequences 
for many youth, particularly from more rural counties. 
Lacking the street sophistication of youth from larger 
urban counties, they became easy targets for exploitation 
and victimization while in the CYA.
In response, the Wilson administration and the state 
legislature passed legislation that created a financial 
penalty for counties that committed to the CYA for 
low-level delinquent acts. Within a year of its passage the 
CYA population began to decline again. Also during the 
late 1990s, the state empowered the Office of Inspec-
tor General (OIG) to begin investigating conditions in 
CYA institutions. From 2000 to 2003, the OIG issued a 
series of stinging reports that rebuked any notion that the 
CYA was a well-functioning institutional system provid-
ing rehabilitation to its wards. Instead, the OIG reports 
demonstrated a system in chaos that provided ineffective 
services in a poorly managed and highly punitive prison-
like environment. The OIG investigations, combined 
with a series of media exposés, resulted in at least one leg-
islative hearing, which further revealed the system-wide 
failure of California’s youth corrections system (Office of 
the Inspector General, 2005).
The Farrell Litigation
The demise of the CYA was further accelerated in 2003 
when a series of reports on conditions within the institu-
tions by independent correctional experts was released 
by the California Attorney General’s office. The reports 
were the result of negotiations over a class action lawsuit 
filed by the Berkeley-based Prison Law Office and the 
law firm of Latham Watkins over conditions in the CYA. 
The plaintiffs contended that the state was utterly failing 
to deliver the rehabilitation services it was statutorily 
mandated to provide. Instead, the suit claimed that the 
CYA was little more than a poorly managed youth prison 
where children were exposed to high levels of routine  
violence with no meaningful rehabilitative services  
(Farrell v. Cate, 2004).
The years of critiques about California’s youth correct-
ions were confirmed in November 2004 when the 
Schwarzenegger administration entered into a consent 
decree with the plaintiffs by admitting to the full range 
of failures highlighted in the lawsuit. Recognizing an 
untenable legal and moral position, the state agreed to fix 
the problem by eliminating its 19th century-style train-
ing school system and replacing it with a modern system 
designed to be rehabilitative (California Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile 
Justice, 2006).
The impact of the Farrell v. Cate lawsuit on California’s 
juvenile justice system is profound. Perhaps the most  
apparent impact is the unprecedented reduction in 
county commitments throughout the state. While CYA 
commitments had been in decline since 1996, the  
declines accelerated after the filing of the lawsuit and  
continued unfavorable news coverage. The unfavorable 
news coverage included two CYA staff being caught on 
tape in February 2004 pummeling two wards who were 
offering no resistance (Little Hoover Commission, 2008).
The chaotic and deeply troubled conditions brought to 
light by the lawsuit led the Schwarzenegger administra-
tion to abolish the 62-year-old agency in 2005 and merge 
its functions with the adult prison system into a newly 
created California Department of Corrections and  
Rehabilitation (CDCR). Under this new structure, the  
old CYA was reconstituted as the Division of Juvenile 
Justice (DJJ)4, a department within the new super agency 
(Little Hoover Commission, 2008).
4 The 2005 reorganization of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agencies into the 
CDCR created the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). The DJF is commonly referred 
to as the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ).
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the consent decree
The Farrell consent decree mandated that the DJJ  
engage in a series of comprehensive reforms that included 
replacing outdated and poorly designed facilities and 
creating a rehabilitative system. In March 2006, a team 
of independent youth corrections experts was hired to 
complete a thorough assessment of the system and make 
recommendations for moving forward. A summary of 
their findings is on the right. Based on their analysis, the 
experts concluded that it was “a system that is broken 
almost everywhere you look” (California Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile 
Justice, 2006, p. 1).
In July 2006, the state offered its own remedial plan that 
detailed the elements of a new system and included the 
abandonment of the current institutional structure and 
the adoption of small therapeutic living units. Since the 
promulgation of this plan, the state has made little prog-
ress in achieving the massive reforms, and there is almost 
no prospect of replacing the outdated facilities in the near 
future (Macallair, 2010).
As previously noted, the primary residual effect of the 
Farrell lawsuit has been the unprecedented declines in 
county commitments. The decline in county commit-
ments continues and was accelerated in August 2007 with 
the passage of Senate Bill 81 (SB 81). By severely restrict-
ing the ability of counties to commit low-level offenders 
to the DJJ, SB 81 represents the most comprehensive 
state-initiated juvenile justice reform effort of the past 
five decades. In addition to imposing restrictions on the 
type of offenders counties could commit to DJJ, SB 81 
attempts to reduce state youth correctional populations 
through a block grant that gives counties the means  
to develop additional probation services. California’s  
Youthful Offender Block Grant, initiated through  
SB 81, provided capacity-building funding to probation  
departments statewide (Macallair, Males and  
McCracken, 2009).
The Farrell lawsuit has drastically altered the California 
juvenile justice system and has resulted in an unprece-
dented realignment of services and interventions from the 
state to the counties. In the past 30 years, commitment 
to state youth corrections institutions have fallen by  
80%. With the reduction in commitments, the state 
institutional population plummeted to the lowest level 
since the CYA’s founding, with a current population of 
1,262, as of December 2010 (Division of Juvenile Justice, 
2010c). With the declining institutional populations,  
the state took the unprecedented step of closing five of  
11 youth correctional institutions from 2005 to 2010 
(Males and Macallair, 2010; Macallair, Males and  
McCracken, 2009).5
5  One of these institutions was the Fred C. Nelles Youth Correctional Facility, which had 
operated since 1892.  
Findings of the Correctional Experts in 2006
•	High	levels	of	violence	and	fear	in	state-run	 
 institutions
•	Unsafe	conditions	for	both	residents	and	staff
•		Antiquated	facilities	unsuited	for	any	mission
•		An	adult	corrections	mentality	with	an	 
 adult/juvenile mix
•		Management	by	crisis	with	little	time	to	make	 
 changes
•		Frequent	lockdowns	to	manage	violence	with	 
	subsequent	program	reductions
•		Time	adds	for	infractions	adding	more	than	eight		 	
 months to average lengths of stay
•		Lengths	of	stay	almost	triple	the	average	for	 
 the nation
•		Hours	on	end	when	many	youth	have	nothing	to	do
•		Vocational	classrooms	that	are	idle	or	running	half		 	
 speed
•		Capitulation	to	gang	culture	with	youth	housed	by	 
 gang affiliation
•		Low	levels	of	staffing	and	huge	living	units
•		Abysmal	achievements	despite	enormous	outlays	 
 for education
•		Information	systems	incapable	of	supporting	 
 management
•		Little	partnership	with	counties	and	a	fragmented		 	
 system
•		Poor	re-entry	planning	and	too	few	services	on	parole
•		Enormous	costs	with	little	to	show	for	it
Source: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,  
Division of Juvenile Justice, 2006.
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While the Farrell lawsuit reforms continue, the issue  
is being raised whether to maintain the state role in  
administering institutions. Since the county probation 
departments provide services for 99% of the youth who 
come into contact with the juvenile justice system in a 
given year, proposals have been put forth to close the state 
institutions and transfer additional resources to allow the 
counties to absorb the remaining DJJ population (Legis-
lative Analyst’s Office, 2009; Little Hoover Commission, 
2008; Macallair, Males and McCracken, 2009).
The Future of the  
Division of Juvenile Justice
In July 2008, California’s prestigious Little Hoover  
Commission, a quasi-independent state organization that 
conducts policy studies to improve the functioning of 
state government, proposed closing the remaining state 
institutions and returning the remaining youth to the 
county. Under the plan, the state would no longer man-
age youth correctional institutions, but instead would 
establish an agency to monitor and evaluate county  
juvenile justice services. The new agency also would  
promote best practices and set standards for services, 
similar to the original CYA concept (Little Hoover  
Commission, 2008).
In a February 2009 report to the legislature, the Little 
Hoover Commission report received an endorsement 
from the nonpartisan Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO). 
In its report, the LAO called for the closing of the DJJ 
and the realignment of funds to the counties to build 
their capacities to handle the youth they currently send  
to the state (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2009).
With the growing attention toward possible DJJ closure, 
CJCJ conducted an analysis of juvenile institutional  
capacity at the county level that was released in May 
2009. According to the CJCJ analysis, there are nearly 
3,000 surplus institutional beds at the county level as  
a result of a massive building program that occurred  
beginning in the late 1990s. The institutional building 
program resulted from passage of the Juvenile Account-
ability Block Grant that provided federal incentive grants 
to counties to expand their local juvenile halls and ranch-
es. By 2009, more than 73 new or renovated facilities 
were completed, giving counties an unparalleled range of 
institutional options from newly designed high-security 
juvenile halls to medium-security ranches and camps.  
The surplus institutional space is more than sufficient to 
house the remaining population now committed to state 
facilities (Macallair, Males and McCracken, 2009).
Closing the state training schools would usher in a new 
era in California’s juvenile justice system. With services 
concentrated at the county level, a broader range of local 
services could be provided for higher-needs offenders. 
The higher-needs offenders are historically the least likely 
to be served effectively and the most likely to be com-
mitted to state institutions. Having a two-tiered system 
allows county systems to abdicate responsibility for their 
more challenging population. Given the continued dif-
ficulties encountered by the state in providing humane 
and effective care to youth in its custody, the recognition 
for an alternative system has never been greater. With a 
properly constructed state funding stream, modeled on 
SB 81, county probation services could be augmented  
to meet the new responsibilities (Macallair, Males and  
McCracken, 2009).
For the small population of youth who require treatment 
in a secure facility, counties could reserve a living unit 
in their juvenile halls and/or subcontract with a county 
with surplus institutional space. Closing state institutions 
would permanently restrict counties from relying on state 
institutions for challenging youth. Additionally, the temp-
tation to use surplus county institutional space for youth 
who could be better served in the community is avoided 
(Macallair, Males and McCracken, 2009).
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The Discretion of Probation Departments  
and Juvenile Courts
The California juvenile justice system is at a crossroads. While still  
relying on a limited range of intervention options, there is a strong 
desire among many juvenile justice practitioners to develop a broader 
array of options. However, the traditional approach still characterizes 
many jurisdictions and is reflected in the procedures employed at the 
various system stages from arrest through disposition.
In 2009 there were 204,696 juvenile arrests in California. Of these, 
28% were for felonies, 57% were misdemeanors and another 15% 
were for status offenses (Criminal Justice Statistical Center, 2010). 
If a youth is arrested for a delinquent act, the police officer exercises 
discretion as to whether to send the youth home with a citation that 
requires the youth to appear in court on a certain date. In an instance 
where the offense is considered more serious, the police officer can 
decide to transport the youth to the county juvenile hall to be formally 
processed. Once taken to the juvenile hall, jurisdiction is turned over 
to juvenile hall staff and the youth is formally processed. Known as the 
booking process, the youth is first photographed and fingerprinted.
Upon assuming jurisdiction, the probation department begins the 
intake stage of juvenile justice processing. At this stage a designated 
intake probation officer conducts a brief review of the youth, which 
may include a records and probation status check. Upon reviewing the 
The current judicial process of California’s 
juvenile justice system relies heavily on the 
discretion of police officers, probation  
officers and the juvenile court. At each stage 
of the process, through arrest, hearings, 
disposition and post-disposition options, 
there are numerous possible outcomes for a 
youth, ranging from release to community-
based services on probation, detention,  
out-of-home placement or commitment  
to an institution. Probation officers, in par-
ticular, heavily influence the outcomes for  
juvenile offenders. Historically, probation 
departments relied on a limited array of  
interventions and outcomes were inconsis-
tent, but this is changing as departments 
broaden their ranges of intervention and 
standardize outcomes.
Section ii includes information on the following topics:
•  The discretion of police officers, probation officers and the  
juvenile court
•  The legal process for a juvenile offender
• Adult court transfers in California
• Changes in county probation practices
   s e c t I o n  I I 
The Current State of the California  
Juvenile Justice System
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police report or the arrest charge, the intake probation 
officer in many jurisdictions will complete a risk assess-
ment instrument (RAI). The RAI is used to objectively 
score a youth on various risk factors to help the probation 
officer determine whether to release or detain the youth. 
The RAI can have a profound impact on county deten-
tion practices, since it is designed to take away many of 
the disparities that occur when probation staff simply rely 
on subjective judgment.
Key Juvenile Justice Terms
Adjudication 
The	equivalent	of	an	adult	conviction	hearing.	A	minor	
becomes a ward of the court if it is decided he or she  
was responsible for his or her actions.
Delinquent 
A person under 18 who has been found to have  
committed a crime, but who, as a minor, lacks full 
responsibility and cannot be tried as an adult.
Detention 
The detaining of a youth in a secure facility while  
awaiting a hearing or disposition.
Disposition 
The forum in which a judge presents the action or 
treatment plan that will be imposed on an adjudicated 
youth.
Juvenile Court 
A special court or department of a trial court that deals 
with underage defendants charged with crimes or  
who are neglected or out of the control of their parents.
Status Offense 
An offense that would not be considered a crime for  
an adult, such as truancy, running away, underage 
drinking or curfew violation.
Judicial Waiver 
The judicial discretion by which it is decided that a 
minor will be tried in the adult criminal system.
Direct File  
The power of the district attorney to transfer youth over 
the age of 14 for a variety of offenses to adult court 
without a juvenile court hearing.
If the youth falls into a low-risk category, the youth can 
be released. If the decision is to release, a call is made to 
the youth’s parents to come to the juvenile hall and take 
their child home. If the parent is not home or refuses, the 
child often remains in custody until the parent can be 
contacted.
If the youth remains in custody, a detention hearing is 
held within 48 hours. At the detention hearing, the judge 
hears from the youth’s counsel and the district attorney. 
In addition, the judge also receives a recommendation 
from the probation department representative as to 
whether the youth should continue to be detained  
or released.
Currently there is no database on how many youth get 
detained at the detention hearing, but detention rates 
based on arrests vary from county to county. High deten-
tion rates can be determined by comparing felony arrests 
with county detention admissions. Some counties detain 
few youth, while others detain many (Champion, 2004).
Following the detention hearing, the California juvenile 
justice process moves to the adjudication stage. At this 
stage, the probation department makes a recommenda-
tion to the district attorney as to whether a petition 
should be filed based on the evidence in the case. Once 
the probation department makes its recommendations, 
the decision to file charges rests with the district attorney 
(Champion, 2004).
Once the district attorney files charges, the case moves 
to a preliminary hearing. Usually, the assigned defense 
attorney meets with the district attorney to negotiate the 
charges prior to the preliminary hearing. The success of 
these negotiations often determines the youth’s fate. At 
the preliminary hearing, the youth appears in front of 
the judge and is formally presented with the charges. The 
youth can choose to admit the petition (plead guilty) or 
deny the petition (Champion, 2004).
If the youth denies the petition, the case moves to the 
adjudication hearing, which is the juvenile court’s equiva-
lent of a trial. Since there are no jury trials in California’s 
juvenile court, the judge determines the youth’s guilt or 
innocence (Champion, 2004).
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In the event that the petition is sustained, the case moves 
to the disposition stage. Prior to the disposition hearing, 
a probation officer is required to write a predisposition 
report. Since the dawn of the juvenile court, the  
predisposition report has been the juvenile court’s most 
crucial document. Ideally, the predisposition report 
contains all relevant information about the youth’s life 
and circumstances, along with a description of the youth’s 
involvement in the crime, prior record and potential for 
rehabilitation. This information forms the basis for the 
probation officer’s disposition recommendations that are 
formally provided to the court. Historically, judges  
follow the probation officer recommendation contained 
in the predisposition report 90% of the time  
(Champion, 2004).
Juvenile court judges currently have four basic options 
available at the disposition stage. The most commonly 
imposed disposition option is to impose formal probation 
and send the youth home. Formal probation means that 
the youth is made a ward of the juvenile court and there-
fore subject to conditions set by the court. Under formal 
probation, the youth usually is sent home under proba-
tion supervision with conditions. The conditions are both 
general and specific (Champion, 2004).
General conditions apply to all youth placed on pro-
bation, while specific conditions are designed for the 
individual youth. Judges can exercise broad discretion in 
establishing specific conditions, provided they are related 
to the youth’s conduct. Specific conditions can include a 
requirement that the youth attend outpatient drug  
treatment or participate in a community service proj-
ect. Specific conditions often are very much tied to the 
resources of the individual county probation department 
and have a sizable effect on disposition decisions.
Most youth placed on formal probation are sent home 
with minimal supervision. Due to traditional underfund-
ing of probation services, many jurisdictions’ formal  
probation supervision historically involved a simple 
check-in with a probation officer once a month to  
determine compliance with conditions of probation. In 
recent years, departments have attempted to address this  
problem by creating specialized supervision units with 
lower caseloads to supervise higher-risk probationers.
In the event that a youth is not able to be maintained in 
the home due to parental neglect or poor behavior, judges 
have the option of committing the youth to out-of-home 
placement. Out-of-home placement is the next most 
commonly imposed sanction by California juvenile court 
and involves sending a youth to live in a group home. 
Group homes are residential placements that operate as a 
form of foster care, located in community settings. Unlike 
a traditional foster home, group homes are required to 
provide professional services that usually include licensed 
treatment and education. In California, there are 14 rate 
classification levels of group homes. The rate classification 
levels determine the intensity of service with 14 being the 
highest. Currently, most youth committed through the 
juvenile courts are placed in a rate classification group 
from 8 to 14 (Steinhart and Butts, 2002).
Many large counties operate ranches and camps.  
Ranches and camps usually are located in more rural or 
remote areas and are minimal-security facilities that  
conform to a classic training or reform school design. A 
training school design is constructed to hold between 
80 to 150 youth in open dormitory living units. Even 
though per capita spending on ranches and camps is 
approximately half of the per capita spending on group 
homes, these institutions usually are reserved for youth 
who have failed in the community and group home 
placement. These facilities are considered the last stop 
before the youth is committed to the DJJ (Steinhart  
and Butts, 2002).
Four Basic Judicial Options  
for Disposition
1. Formal Probation
2. Out-of-Home/Group Home Placement
3. Commitment to Ranch or Camp
4. Commitment to DJJ
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California Juvenile Justice System
Recreated from information provided by the Criminal Justice and Statistics Center (2010).
Arrest by  
law enforcement
Taken to juvenile hall 
to meet with a  
probation officer
Informal probation
Detained in 
juvenile hallCase closed
Detention hearing
Released until trial
Pre-trial 
hearing
Attend court date 
and judge decides 
what to do
Case closed
Detained in 
juvenile hall
Admit 
charges
Charges 
remain
Charges 
reduced
Charges 
dropped Case closed
Ajudicatory  
hearing  
(The TRIAL)
Charges are 
found not to  
be true
Case closed
Charges are 
found to be true
Dispositional 
hearing
1. Probation
•	Release	to	parent	 
or guardian.
•	Receive	a	list	of	
strict rules from the 
court that must be 
followed.
•	If	the	rules	are	not	
followed, re-arrest 
can result.
 
2. treatment  
Program
 
•	Designed	to	provide	
rehabilitation from 
drugs, alcohol,  
violent behavior, 
abuse, etc.
•	Residential	 
placement or day  
treatment only.
 
 
3. out-of-Home 
Placement
 
•	Taken	out	of	parents’	
custody and placed 
in a group home, 
usually run by 
counselors or social 
workers. 
•	It	can	be	in	the	local	
community, but  
usually is in a differ-
ent city or town.
 
 
4. camp or ranch
 
•	Secure	detention	
facility run by the 
county probation 
department.
•	For	serious	crimes	 
or multiple offenses. 
•	Last	placement	 
option before DJJ  
or prison.
 
5. division of  
juvenile justice  
(formerly California 
Youth Authority) 
 
•	High-level	secure	 
detention facility run 
by the state Depart-
ment of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation.
•	For	very	serious	
crimes as a last 
resort.
•	 If	tried	as	an	adult,	
usually sent to DJJ 
until age 18 and then 
transferred to prison.
 
Receive a citation with 
a date to go to court 
and be released
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As previously mentioned, commitments to DJJ vary 
widely by county. DJJ recommendations often are based 
on the probation system’s organizational culture and  
program resources. In many instances, decisions to  
commit to DJJ are more a function of past practice. 
Many counties use DJJ commitments as a means to 
remove the more challenging youth, while others make 
concerted efforts to address youth problems at the  
local level.
Adult Court Transfers in California 
Prior to the decision to file a petition, California district 
attorneys have discretion to transfer certain cases to the 
adult court for adult prosecution. Traditionally, this  
practice has primarily targeted youth who commit the 
most serious offenses, as listed under California Welfare 
and Institutions Code 707(b). In recent years, through 
changes in state law and by voter initiative, prosecutorial 
capacity to seek adult court transfers for juvenile offend-
ers has been broadened. These changes in the law  
represent a reversal of the trend that existed throughout 
most of the 20th century (Steinhart and Butts, 2002; 
Little Hoover Commission, 2008).
The creation of the California juvenile court in 1903 
created an alternative to adult court prosecution of youth 
who committed felonies, which had previously been the 
standard practice. Early juvenile court advocates strenu-
ously argued for youth to remain under the juvenile 
court regardless of their crime. As a result, the general 
trend through much of the 20th century was expanding 
juvenile court jurisdiction, including raising the age of 
jurisdiction to 18 and expanding the court’s capacity to 
handle all types of serious offenders (Nunn and  
Clearly, 2004).
The changes were founded on the belief that exposing 
young people to adult court trials and incarceration with 
adult offenders simply rendered them worse criminals. 
In the past couple of decades, this premise, which drove 
juvenile justice policy for much of the 20th century, has 
been reversed. Since the early 1990s, the age at which a 
juvenile could be tried in adult court has been lowered in 
California from age 16 to age 14. Then in March 2000, 
Proposition 21, a voter-approved initiative, expanded the 
number of offenses for which juveniles were eligible for 
adult court transfers and created new legal avenues for 
adult court transfer  (State of California, 1996; Steinhart 
and Butts, 2002).
Historically, before a youth could be transferred to adult 
court, the case had to be presented to a juvenile court 
judge prior to the adjudication process. At this hearing, 
the judge heard evidence about the youth’s amenability 
to juvenile court treatment. Amenability is determined 
by five criteria, with the ultimate decision resting with 
the juvenile court judge. The five criteria listed under 
California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 707 
are: the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the 
minor, whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to 
the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction, the  
minor’s previous delinquent history, the success of previ-
ous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the 
minor, and the circumstances and gravity of the offense 
alleged to have been committed by the minor. Youth 
who commit serious crimes must be found amenable on 
all five criteria and the burden of proof is on the youth 
(Macallair, 1995; Steinhart and Butts, 2002).
California’s Proposition 21
Expanding Adult Court Transfers
•	 Expands	the	number	of	youth	eligible	for	adult	court		
 transfers by tightening amenability standards
•	Creates	an	automatic	mandatory	transfer	for	murder		
 and certain sex crimes
•	Creates	new	direct	file	provision	that	allows	 
 prosecutors to charge a juvenile directly in adult  
 court
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Under the old law, youth accused of less serious offenses 
could also be tried as adults. However, in these cases, 
the burden of proof was on the state to prove absence of 
amenability, and youth needed only to prove amenability 
on three of the five criteria to remain in the juvenile court 
(Macallair, 1995; Steinhart and Butts, 2002).
With the passage of Proposition 21, youth who commit 
less serious crimes are no longer given the benefit of a 
less strenuous hearing. Instead, all youth for whom the 
district attorney decides to seek adult court transfer must 
be found amenable on all five criteria, and bear the  
burden of proving their amenability (Steinhart and  
Butts, 2002).
Even more severe, Proposition 21 created a statutory 
exclusion for murder and certain sex crimes for all youth 
age 14 or older. Therefore, if youth are accused of these 
crimes, they are automatically transferred to the adult 
court for prosecution and are not eligible for juvenile 
court jurisdiction. 
The final provision of Proposition 21 that seems to have 
gained greater resonance among prosecutors in certain 
counties is the provision for direct file. Direct file allows 
prosecutors to file cases directly in adult court without 
consulting a juvenile court judge or convening a juvenile 
court amenability hearing (Proposition 21, 2000). This 
approach is widely regarded as having the greatest  
potential for increasing adult court transfers, as full  
discretion rests with the district attorney. Florida first  
adopted the direct file in 1984 and it generally is believed 
to be the primary reason why the state has the highest 
adult court transfer rates in the country.
Since the passage of Proposition 21, there has been a 
steady increase in the number of youth transferred to 
adult court in California, suggesting that prosecutors are 
using this new authority. However, these youth are not 
showing up in the adult system either for temporary con-
finement in DJJ facilities or in the adult prison system. 
The absence of these youth in state facilities indicates that 
they are receiving probationary sentencing. While they may 
serve a period of incarceration in adult county jail facili-
ties, they do not appear to be receiving longer periods of 
confinement in the adult system. However, since the adult 
system has fewer rehabilitative services available, there are 
fewer program options available to youth sentenced as 
adults. Ironically, if juveniles are receiving lighter sentences 
in the adult court, prosecutors may simply be limiting the 
number of potential sentencing options and intervention 
services that would otherwise be available if youth  
remained in the juvenile court (Macallair, Males and  
McCracken, 2009).
The overwhelming evidence shows that subjecting youth 
to imprisonment in adult correctional facilities is counter-
productive. This reality was well recognized at the end of 
the 19th century and was a basic premise for the creation  
of a separate juvenile justice system. Recent changes in 
the law are driven primarily by ideological assertions that 
harsher treatment promotes public safety. In fact, youth 
exposed to adult imprisonment have higher rates of recidi-
vism and are more likely to escalate the severity of their 
criminal behavior than youth treated with a more rational 
and reasoned range of individualized interventions.  
Therefore, any effort to improve the functioning of the 
California juvenile justice system must include strategies  
to reduce adult court transfers (Redding, 2010).
Changes to California Probation Practice 
and the Use of County Facilities
The passage of SB 81 in August 2007 potentially changes 
the nature of California juvenile probation practice at the 
county level. In addition to restricting the ability of coun-
ties to commit non-serious offenders to state institutions, 
the law also extended juvenile court jurisdiction. Under  
the law, county probation departments now can provide 
services to youth up to the age of 21 (Senate Bill 81, 2007).
While few departments have yet to embrace these changes 
by extending services to age 21, the new law provides an 
opportunity to offer services to this transitional-age popula-
tion. The SB 81 law is consistent with the emerging trend 
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toward extending support services to youth throughout 
the child welfare and mental health systems. Child welfare 
experts have long recognized the problem of curtailing 
services and support for youth once they reach their 18th 
birthday, since few youth are prepared to confront the 
challenges of adulthood, especially those without families 
and/or from troubled backgrounds. SB 81 is a vehicle for 
implementing substantive changes, extending the scope of 
services and providing services to transitional-age youth 
in the juvenile justice system (Dawood, 2009; Macallair, 
Males and McCracken, 2009).
Another long-term ramification is the SB 81 clause that 
allows counties to retain youth in county youth facilities 
until age 21. Under the previous law, youth could only 
be housed in juvenile halls past their 18th birthday upon 
a judge’s specific approval. The prevailing practice has 
been to transfer youth over age 18 to the local county jail 
pending their adjudication or for post disposition. How-
ever, if the juvenile court wanted to sentence the youth to 
a period of incarceration, the only option was the county 
jail, provided the youth agreed to the sentence and opted 
not to challenge it. California law otherwise proscribed 
sentencing youth under juvenile court jurisdiction to 
adult institutions (Dawood, 2009; Macallair, Males and 
McCracken, 2009).
Under the new law, counties now have the option of  
using juvenile hall space for short- or long-term post- 
disposition confinement. The impact on probation  
practice is that certain juvenile hall wings can be set aside 
for the small number of county youth who are now sent 
to the DJJ. Maintaining these youth at the county level 
has many advantages:
• Youth are able to maintain contact with family  
members.
• Family members can be engaged in the treatment 
process.
• Systems are able to access a broader assortment  
of community resources.
• Responsibility for the youth is retained within the 
jurisdiction where the youth lives.
• Exposure to the DJJ gang subculture is reduced.
• Exposure to extreme violence in the state  
correctional institutions is reduced.
• The potential for counties to use existing institutional 
space for less serious offenders is reduced  
(Macallair, Males and McCracken, 2009).
Violence is structurally endemic to large congregate cor-
rectional institutions. Long ago, research in the juvenile 
justice field established that as institutional populations 
increase, rates of violence escalate. In California this 
occurs because youth with the most challenging behav-
ioral issues are housed within a large institutional setting 
where youth reside in open dormitories (California Youth 
Authority, 1980; Lerner, 1986).
As previously noted, in these institutions the strong and 
sophisticated youth prey upon the weaker and more 
vulnerable youth. Youth 
from less urbanized 
counties often are  
particularly vulnerable 
since they often do not 
possess the level of  
street sophistication  
of more urbanized  
youth (California  
Youth Authority,  
1980; Lerner, 1986).  
Another long-term  
ramification is the SB 81 
clause that allows  
counties to retain youth 
in county youth facilities 
until age 21.
Youth engaging in county-level services
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Therefore, to survive in California’s youth correctional 
institutions, youth are compelled to join gangs. The  
presence of a gang culture within the state’s youth cor-
rectional system is an intractable problem that defies 
solutions. By relying on local facilities, juvenile courts can 
better protect youth and avoid further escalating violence 
or gang tendencies that result from exposure to state 
facilities (Macallair, Males and McCracken, 2009).
With counties currently operating with excess institu-
tional capacity, there is an unprecedented opportunity 
to end the practice of sending youth to state-run institu-
tions by maintaining them in local institutions (Macallair, 
Males and McCracken, 2009). In addition, by reserving 
institutional space for the more serious offenders, coun-
ties avoid the temptation of filling institutional space with 
less serious youth.
Many counties are reluctant to endorse the concept of 
maintaining higher-end and higher-needs offenders at the 
local level. The arguments tend to be based on the belief 
that some offenders cannot be handled at the county 
level because of their level of violence and the absence of 
county expertise. Arguments against maintaining youth 
in local institutions include:
• Local institutions are not designed for long-term 
confinement and are inappropriate for more  
sophisticated youth.
• Local institutions do not have an adequate array  
of services for violent or aggressive youth.
• Maintaining certain youth at the county level com-
promises public safety and sends the wrong message 
to would-be offenders.
•	Maintaining problematic youth in local facilities 
disrupts the institutional environment and impairs 
treatment of other youth.
• County probation departments are not equipped to 
handle these more difficult youth.
While these arguments are generally well intentioned, 
they represent a traditional practice perspective. The 
major objective in systems reform is promoting innova-
tive thought that changes prevailing practices. In this 
instance, county facilities are now actually better designed 
and equipped than any of the remaining state youth 
correctional facilities. Recently constructed juvenile halls 
are maximum-security institutions with modern designs. 
The modern designs include living units with individual 
cells of no more than 20. Additional capacity issues can 
be addressed by utilizing existing youth block grant funds 
to upgrade institutional treatment and staffing patterns 
(Macallair, Males and McCracken, 2009).
With the state’s chronic fiscal crisis, county government 
will be expected to assume responsibility for a wider range 
of services. Nowhere is this more evident than in the  
juvenile justice sector. In addition to SB 81, proposals 
from the Little Hoover Commission and the Legislative 
Analyst’s Office recommend the permanent closure of  
the state correctional institutions. Many counties should  
begin preparing to serve an older, more delinquent  
population. The decline of the state correctional system 
provides an opportunity to eliminate an outdated 
100-year-old institutional structure in favor of a modern 
21st century approach.
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the 26 countIes examIned here—with 600,000 juveniles 
and a total population of 4.5 million — span a wide range of condi-
tions relevant to juvenile justice outcomes. The purpose of this analysis 
is to detail which counties have pursued successful juvenile justice 
strategies, as measured by crime and incarceration outcomes.
the 26 counties have been divided into three categories:
• urban central valley: four counties located in the Central Valley, 
each with populations exceeding 400,000 in 2010 and containing  
a city of at least 100,000 people, and with juvenile populations  
(age 10-17) of 50,000 or more.
• sierra front: nine rapidly growing counties along the western Sierra 
front and adjacent Central Valley, which have an aggregate popula-
tion of 1.5 million and juvenile populations of 10,000 to 40,000.
• mountain/rural: the remaining 13 counties, aggregate population 
335,000, generally are slower-growing, have no major urban areas 
and have juvenile populations of 7,000 or less.
 
 Section iii includes information on the following topics:
• The data reveals county-level variations in felony rate compared to 
arrest and/or detention rate, rate of pre-disposition detention, time 
spent in juvenile facilities and the ratio of arrest, adjudication and 
detention between genders and ethnicities for similar illegal activity.
• Areas with large growth in nonwhite juvenile populations led the 
region in declining felony rate, except in the Mountain/Rural area.  
Despite these declining felony rates, there have been accompanying 
high ratios of arrest to incarceration in areas with growing popula-
tions of nonwhite youth, showing the presence of Disproportionate 
Minority Confinement.
• Commitments to DJJ are lower for the entire region, and are low in 
statewide comparison. Local detention rates, however, have declined 
less in comparison.
This section includes data gathered from 
the 26 counties that fall within Sierra Health 
Foundation’s region of concern. In recent 
years, the demographics within the region 
have undergone major changes, including 
population growth that is largely compared 
to statewide statistics, and drastic changes 
in ethnic composition, although ethnicity  
differs among areas. These 26 diverse  
counties have been divided into three  
categories: Urban Central Valley, Sierra  
Front and Mountain/Rural. The analysis  
measures county-level juvenile justice 
outcomes by crime and incarceration, and 
reveals a wealth of sometimes surprising  
information on the effect of policy and  
practice county to county.
   s e c t I o n  I I I
Statistical Overview of the 26 Counties 
Served by Sierra Health Foundation
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 6 The original version of this map was retrieved electronically from the University of 
California, Berkeley web site at http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/EART/images/ca-out4.gif
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County-by-County Demographics and Juvenile Justice Trends
The counties in each category are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2. These summary tables indicate clear individual 
differences among the counties, as well as some similarities by category.
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009; Demographic Research Unit, 2010.
TAble 1  |  Juvenile demographics for 26 Sierra Health counties 
(ranked by population size)
Youth population age 10-17, 2009
                                                                  Percent  
County Total White Hispanic Asian Black Native Nonwhite
Urban	Central	Valley	counties	(4)
Sacramento 172,403 78,490 47,424 24,705 20,536 1,247 54%
San Joaquin 102,073 29,671  46,343 17,866 7,662 531 71%
Stanislaus 76,564 27,295 42,992 3,370 2,326 582 64%
Solano 49,957 20,482 15,443 7,644 6,037 351 59%
Subtotal 400,997 155,939 152,201 53,586 36,560 2,711 61%
Sierra	Front	counties	(9)
Placer 40,990 29,657 8,693 2,155 238 247 28%
Yuba/Sutter 23,354 11,296 8,845 2,286 492 435 47%
   Sutter 13,002 5,493 5,646 1,543 203 117 58%
   Yuba 10,352 5,804 3,199 743 289 317 44%
Butte 23,320 16,736 4,633 934 398 619 28%
Yolo 21,879 10,077 9,136 1,658 851 157 54%
El Dorado 20,743 17,122 3,041 356 81 141 17%
Shasta 20,534 17,059 1,874 604 186 810 17%
Nevada 9,954 8,845 936 66 33 75 11%
Tehama 7,077 4,912 1,948 59 38 121 31%
Subtotal 167,851 115,704 39,106 8,118 2,318 2,606 31%
Mountain/Rural	counties	(13)
Tuolumne 4,741 4,050 503 43 32 112 15%
Siskiyou 4,443 3,344 713 58 65 263 25%
Calaveras 4,238 3,429 667 36 28 77 19%
Glenn 3,696 1,817 1,613 177 9 79 51%
Amador 3,501 2,845 461 27 108 60 19%
Lassen 3,448 2,742 505 35 50 115 20%
Colusa 2,940 1,019 1,806 50 11 53 65%
Plumas 1,907 1,604 203 6 24 70 16%
Trinity 1,454 1,280 88 9 3 74 12%
Mono 1,366 727 596 15 0 28 47%
Modoc 1,126 896 177 6 1 45 20%
Sierra 305 262 37 0 3 3 14%
Alpine 101 53 22 0 1 25 48%
Subtotal 33,266 24,068 7,392 464 336 1,006 28%
Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health 602,114 295,711 198,698 62,167 39,213 6,323 51%
California 4,538,339 1,507,492 2,244,109 295,323 462,088 29,327 67%
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Note that as a group, about 13% of the state’s youth 
reside in the Sierra Health counties. Of the total state’s 
youth, the Sierra Health counties account for 20% of 
white youth, a considerably higher juvenile crime (felony) 
rate and a slightly lower rate of juvenile incarceration. 
The most evident feature is diversity. Sierra Health 
counties’ youth populations range from 100 (Alpine) 
to 170,000 (Sacramento) and from 29% white (San 
Joaquin) to 88% white (Trinity). In this paper, “white” 
refers to European-origin. With a five-fold span in felony 
rates (Solano to Mono), incarceration rates range from 
zero (four counties) to 1.4% (Trinity) of youth behind 
bars. While Sierra Health youth poverty rates both as a 
group and for the county categories are similar to those of 
California as a whole, the individual counties show  
wide divergence.
As for the three different county categories, the more 
populous Urban and Front counties have higher felony 
rates than the state average, and the Mountain and Rural 
counties have lower felony rates than the state average. 
The reverse is true for juvenile incarceration rates. The 
high incarceration rate among rural counties is due to 
high levels in six counties (including a very high level in 
Trinity), while the other seven counties show juvenile 
incarceration levels well below the state average.
Before examining the categories in more detail, several 
intriguing sociological features of the Sierra Health coun-
ties are worth noting. Sierra Health counties experienced 
substantially more rapid growth in their youth popula-
tions over the last two decades than the state as a whole, 
even as experiences among the various counties diverged 
radically (Table 3). This mirrors the larger growth in 
populations of all ages, which have risen 39% since 1990 
(compared to 28% statewide), with the Front counties 
showing the largest population growth of all (up 43%). 
Along with rapid numerical increase, youth demograph-
ics have changed more radically over the last two decades 
than in the entire period since statehood.
 
TAble 2  |  Felony and incarceration rates  
for 26 Sierra Health counties 
  
                                           Rate* of juvenile
County               Poverty rate*        Felonies Incarceration
Urban	Central	Valley	counties	(4)
Sacramento 18% 1,312.1  324.8
San Joaquin 22% 1,883.3 235.1
Stanislaus 20% 1,503.0 197.2
Solano 10% 2,350.4 295.1
Subtotal 18% 1,621.8 273.5
Sierra	Front	counties	(9)
Placer 7% 1,337.8 153.2
Yuba/Sutter  950.6 321.1
   Sutter 18% 1,596.7 operate joint
   Yuba 27% 953.1 youth facility 
Butte 19% 1,441.0 227.3
Yolo 15% 1,770.4 361.1
El Dorado 9% 824.3 263.0
Shasta 22% 1,428.5 404.2
Nevada 14% 1,337.5 221.0
Tehama 18% 1,318.9 452.2
Subtotal 16% 1,349.1 272.7
Mountain/Rural	counties	(13)
Tuolumne 15% 1,879.4 0.0
Siskiyou 23% 1,411.2 450.1
Calaveras 15% 1,550.3 0.0
Glenn 17% 1,286.3 460.0
Amador 14% 852.0 27.7
Lassen 15% 1,167.3 493.0
Colusa 22% 788.0 0.0
Plumas 19% 1,289.2 0.0
Trinity 22% 754.5 1,306.7
Mono 17% 454.4 0.0
Modoc 27% 851.8 88.8
Sierra 11% 680.3 0.0
Alpine 22% 759.0 0.0
Subtotal 18% 1,245.9 291.4
Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health 18% 1,523.3 270.4
California  18% 1,290.2 281.9
*All rates are per 100,000 population age 10-17. Poverty rates are for 
age 15-17 for 1999, as reported by the Census. Felony rates are as  
of 2009. Incarceration rates are as of June 2008 and reflect the  
number of juveniles held in state Division of Juvenile Justice or in 
county detention camps and halls. 
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009; Demographic Research Unit, 2010.  
Employment Development Department, 2010.  
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The Urban counties saw the largest numerical and 
percentage growth in youth populations, with more than 
90% of the growth among Hispanics and Asians. These 
four counties have seen the addition of the equivalent of 
new cities of Vallejo and Benicia consisting entirely of  
10- to 17-year-olds in the last two decades. The Front 
counties also had explosive growth, split evenly between 
whites and nonwhites. The Front counties, with 4% of 
the state’s youth population, accounted for more than 
half of the state’s entire white youth population increase. 
Placer, El Dorado and the other Front counties not only 
have borne the brunt of white family migration from the 
state’s urban areas, they have seen rapid Hispanic and 
Asian influxes as well.
The Mountain counties continued to show the slowest 
population growth, but have seen noticeable changes in 
demographics. White and Asian populations remained 
stable, native and black populations showed substantial 
outmigration, and Hispanics showed significant growth 
and now comprise nearly one in four youth in these  
once nearly all-white counties. These demographic shifts 
toward more nonwhite youth are highly noticeable,  
perhaps even jarring, to older residents, particularly in 
Front and Mountain counties where both long-term and 
new populations include a large, white, aging component.
Changes in Juvenile Arrest Rates
To determine what implications these massive shifts in 
youth populations and demographics hold for juvenile 
justice trends, we must first consider the prevailing view. 
Traditional criminological thought is that growth in the 
youth population, particularly more black and Hispanic 
youth, should predict an “explosive increase” in crime and 
violence, as observed in the standard view voiced by crime 
authorities from UCLA’s James Q. Wilson to Princeton 
University’s John DiIulio and Northeastern University’s 
James Alan Fox (DiIulio, 1995; Fox and Piquero, 2003; 
Wilson, 1975).
A cursory reading of the press and commentaries in Sierra 
Health counties7 indicates widespread belief that more 
crime and violence led by youth are indeed occurring.  
An important context for this discussion of juvenile 
justice policy must begin with an evaluation of whether 
Sierra Health counties are experiencing more crime and 
violence spurred by youth offending, both absolutely and 
in comparison to the rest of California.
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009; Demographic Research Unit, 2010. Employment Development Department, 2010.
TAble 3  |  Change in youth population (age 10-17) by race, 1990-2009 
    Absolute change           Percentage change
Sierra Health counties Total White Nonwhite Total White Hispanic Asian Black
Urban Central Valley +145,938 +11,986 +133,952 +57% +8% +177% +79% +54%
Sierra Front +56,467 +27,804 +28,663 +51% +32% +162% +65% +50%
Mountain/Rural +2,918 -283 +3,201 +10% -1% +85% +2% -22%
Sierra Health total +205,323 +39,507 +165,816 +52% +15% +169% +76% +53%
California +1,320,318 +53,716 +1,266,602 +41% +4% +95% +37% +18%
”Absolute change” is the number of youths in 2009 minus the number in 1990. 
“Percent change” refers to the percent change in respective youth populations. “Nonwhite” refers to all those not of European white origin.
7 A 2007 analysis of the Mountain Democrat (El Dorado County) by San Jose State 
University School of Library and Information Science graduate seminar researchers 
found negative stories dominated youth coverage, chiefly concerning implications of 
widespread crime (Berniera, A., 2011).
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In reality, what occurred over the last two decades was 
just the opposite of what crime authorities would predict 
and the press typically depicts. As Sierra Health counties 
experienced rapid growth in their youth populations, 
especially their nonwhite components (Table 3), both 
overall crime and youth arrest rates plummeted (Table 4). 
The rapid racial/ethnic diversification of Sierra Health 
counties (from 66% white in 1990 to 51% nonwhite 
today) did not bring higher crime rates. In fact, those 
counties whose nonwhite population shares increased 
the most tended to have larger declines in juvenile felony 
rates than less rapidly diversifying counties. Rather than 
spurring a new wave of crime, larger numbers of youth 
of color seemed to be the leading edge of a major crime 
decline, especially for all felonies and homicide.
The only exception was an increase in violent crime  
arrests among youth in Mountain counties, which expe-
rienced the slowest population growth. In raw numbers, 
there were 48 violent crime arrests for ages 10 to 17 in 
these 13 counties in 1990, and 93 in 2009 (the latter  
figure is down from the peak of 162 in 1999). Mean-
while, murder rates among Mountain county youth 
plunged by 87% to among the lowest in the state, lower 
even than Western European homicide levels.
TAble 4  |  Change in total crime rates per 100,000 county population, and change in youth  
arrest rates per 100,000 age 10-17, 1990-2009
         Change in overall crime rates                            Change in youth arrest rates
Sierra Health Counties Index Violent Homicide Index Violent Homicide
Urban Central Valley -39% -25% -34% -49% -30% -71%
Sierra Front  -46% -22% -61% -40% -18% -81%
Mountain/Rural  -38% -14% -63% -29% +22% -87%
Sierra Health total -41% -24% -42% -45% -25% -72%
Changes in Juvenile Incarceration Rates
Imprisonment data for state Division of Juvenile Justice 
facilities is available for all counties for 2005-09 and for 
select populous counties prior to 2005. The results are 
uniform, as counties and the state as a whole, both  
since 2005 and since 1999, show very large declines in  
juveniles placed in state facilities (Table 5). It can be 
assumed that cuts in the small numbers of youth placed 
in state facilities for counties for which pre-2005 figures 
are lacking were large as well. Since 2005, Sierra Health 
counties, particularly rural ones, show somewhat larger 
declines in state imprisonments, though numbers for 
these counties were small. By 2009, Sierra Health coun-
ties, particularly less populous ones, were less likely to 
send youth to state facilities than other counties in the 
state, though some county-to-county variations remain.          
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009; Demographic Research Unit, 2010.
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Sierra Health counties have made up for sharper reduc-
tions in state imprisonments of juveniles by showing  
generally slower rates of decline and, in the case of 
Mountain counties, substantial increases in local juvenile 
incarcerations (Table 6). About six times more incarcerat-
ed youth are held in local rather than state facilities today. 
County-by-county variations both in rates and trends 
are large, suggesting some interesting contrasts for study. 
One problem is that some counties may send youths to 
camps or halls in other counties, as in the case of Solano’s 
Fouts Springs facility, requiring local inquiries to deter-
mine the exact numbers of residence by county.
These are only a few of the complexities a closer analysis 
of the county categories will explore. While interestingly 
a higher percentage of nonwhite (Hispanic, Asian, 
African or Native American) youth in a county actually 
predicts a slightly lower juvenile arrest rate and a bigger 
decline in serious crime over the last two decades, it  
is also associated with a somewhat higher juvenile  
incarceration rate. Racial diversification may have 
brought the misperception in some areas that crime was 
getting worse, reflected in higher incarceration levels.
Source: Division of Juvenile Justice, 2010a, 2010b; Demographic Research Unit, 2010; 
Department of the Youth Authority, 1999.
  
TAble 5  |  Rates and changes in  
juvenile incarceration in state DJJ facilities  
2005-2009 (all Sierra Health counties) and 1999-2009  
(four available counties)
  Change in incarceration rates              Incarceration rates*
County 05-09 99-09 1999 2005 2009
Urban	counties
Sacramento -47% -76% 154.6 69.6 37.1
San Joaquin -72% -90% 305.3 107.9 30.4
Stanislaus -67% -84% 182.8 91.3 30.0
Solano -52%   58.3 28.0
Average -59%   81.2 32.9
Sierra Front counties
Placer -13%   22.5 19.5
Butte -82% -84% 133.4 116.2 21.4
Yolo -73%   67.9 18.3
El Dorado -56%   22.2 9.6
Shasta -68%   122.1 39.0
Sutter -26%   83.2 61.5
Yuba -64%   80.2 29.0
Nevada    0.0 10.0
Tehama -83%   167.2 28.3
Average -64%   67.6 24.4
Mountain/Rural counties
Tuolumne -100%   36.4 0.0
Siskiyou -84%   137.7 22.5
Calaveras -100%   40.4 0.0
Glenn 57%   51.6 81.2
Amador -100%   25.3 0.0
Lassen -46%   54.2 29.0
Colusa -100%   68.1 0.0
Plumas    0.0 0.0
Trinity    0.0 0.0
Mono    0.0 0.0
Modoc 8%   82.4 88.8
Sierra -100%   247.5 0.0
Alpine    0.0 0.0
Average -67%   54.0 18.0
Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health -61%   75.7 29.7
California -51% -82% 201.2 72.4 35.3
*Rates are per 100,000 youth age 10-17 by county and year.  
Blank cells indicate data not available or involve comparisons  
with a zero denominator.
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TAble 6  |  Change in local incarcerations and rates, 1999-2008
              Change, 1999-2008            Rate, total local incarcerations
County Total Camps Halls 1999 2005 2008
Urban	counties
Sacramento -9% 25% -25% 310.7 286.7 283.5
San Joaquin -24% -28% -23% 274.9 202.0 208.2
Stanislaus 23%  23% 137.1 193.4 168.3
Solano* 15% -10% 39% 231.5 220.1 267.1
Average -7% 6% -12% 258.6 240.5 240.9
Sierra Front counties
Placer* -22% -97%  171.4 130.1 133.7
Yuba/Sutter* -26% 53% -42% 370.9 300.0 275.1
Butte -13%  -13% 233.2 228.3 203.4
Yolo* 122%  122% 152.9 144.9 339.6
El Dorado* 22% 363% -5% 207.6 194.9 253.4
Shasta* -24% -41% -10% 472.7 434.2 357.4
Nevada* -44% -100% 17% 362.9 209.4 202.9
Tehama* 50%  50% 274.5 373.1 412.5
Average -7% -55% 15% 268.0 231.3 248.3
Mountain/Rural counties
Tuolumne*    0.0 0.0 0.0
Siskiyou 30%  30% 320.7 255.8 415.3
Calaveras    0.0 0.0 0.0
Glenn 78%  78% 209.6 670.6 372.5
Amador* 10% 10%  25.1 25.3 27.7
Lassen 76%  76% 257.3 514.6 451.6
Colusa*    0.0 0.0 0.0
Plumas -100%  -100% 40.0 0.0 0.0
Trinity    0.0 1,952.4 1,255.0
Mono    0.0 0.0 0.0
Modoc    0.0 0.0 0.0
Sierra    0.0 0.0 0.0
Alpine    0.0 0.0 0.0
Average 104% 666% 88% 98.7 245.3 201.4
Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health -4% -12% 0% 250.0 238.2 240.7
California -19% -21% -19% 301.7 246.8 242.9
*Youth held in Fouts Springs Youth Facility in Colusa County are apportioned to Solano, Placer, El Dorado, Amador, Colusa, Yolo, Nevada, 
Shasta, Tehama and Tuolumne counties, among others, which commit youth to the facility. Yuba and Sutter counties jointly operate a  
juvenile hall.
Source: Corrections Standards Authority, 2010.
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Urban central Valley counties
Sacramento, San Joaquin, Stanislaus and Solano counties 
are large, diverse, urbanized counties with a quarter- 
million youth, mostly living in and around major  
population centers such as Sacramento, Stockton and 
Modesto. Since the peak crime era of the early 1990s, 
these counties have experienced major declines in youth 
crime of all types, even as their youth populations grew  
rapidly (up 57%) and continued to diversify to 61% 
nonwhite by 2009 (Table 7).
As seen in Table 8, rates of juvenile incarceration in state 
facilities in the urban counties are relatively uniform, but 
there is considerable variation in incarceration in local 
facilities, where around six in seven detained youth are 
TAble 8  |  Incarcerations per 100,000 youth by facility type
	 	 	 													State	facilities*,	2009	 	 	 	 																					Local	facilities,	2008
Urban	 State	and	Local	 Total	 DJJ	 DAI	 Total	 Camps	 Halls
Sacramento 324.8 37.1 20.9 16.2 287.7 128.8 158.9
San Joaquin 235.1 30.4 25.5 4.9 204.8 38.2 166.5
Stanislaus 197.2 30.0 24.8 5.2 167.2 0.0 167.2
Solano 295.1 28.0 24.0 4.0 267.1 98.2 168.9
Urban	total	 273.5	 32.9	 23.2	 9.7	 240.9	 76.8	 164.1
Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health 270.4 29.7 20.3 9.5 240.7 62.2 178.5
California 281.9 35.3 28.2 7.1 246.6 97.9 148.7
*State incarcerations are in DJJ facilities and include youth sent from juvenile courts (DJJ) and held for adult institutions (DAI).
held. As of July 2008, these urban counties had 1,026 
Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) Board-certified 
juvenile facility beds (716 in halls, 310 in camps), with 
1,002, or 97.7%, occupied. An additional 40 youth, all 
from Sacramento, were held in facilities in other coun-
ties. Though Stanislaus shows a better experience than 
the state, the other three urban Sierra Health counties 
show similar declines in felonies and slower declines in 
violent crime than California as a whole. There appears 
to be no relationship between high levels of incarceration 
and rates of, or changes in, youth crime rates. For exam- 
ple, Stanislaus, which has the lowest rate of incarceration, 
had the largest decline in felony and violent offense rates 
among youth over the last two decades to levels below 
the state average, an experience shared with Sacramento, 
TAble 7  |  Arrests per 100,000 population age 10-17, Urban counties, 1990-2009
 
                Felonies                      Violent crime
Urban		 90-94	 95-99	 00-04	 05-09	 Change	 90-94	 95-99	 00-04	 05-09	 Change
Solano 3,524.3 3,184.2 1,991.0 2,350.4 -33% 827.4 857.1 517.9 699.8 -15%
San Joaquin 3,522.4 3,125.3 2,271.2 1,883.3 -47% 721.6 815.5 628.9 586.8 -19%
Stanislaus 3,495.9 3,044.7 2,003.1 1,503.0 -57% 728.0 717.6 508.4 376.9 -48%
Sacramento 2,703.7 1,997.5 1,480.5 1,312.1 -51% 572.7 514.1 373.8 383.2 -33%
Urban	total	 3,156.6	 2,628.9	 1,832.6	 1,621.8	 -49%	 673.3	 672.6	 478.2	 472.8	 -30%
Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health 2,788.2 2,376.0 1,718.2 1,523.3 -45% 543.1 568.8 424.6 405.2 -25%
California 2,697.1 2,084.2 1,434.2 1,369.2 -49% 627.2 541.8 376.2 362.3 -42%
Sources: Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009; Demographic Research Unit, 2010.
Sources: Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009; Demographic Research Unit, 2010.
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TAble 9  |  Arrests per 100,000 population age 10-17, Sierra Front counties, 1990-2009
 
                  Felonies            Violent crime
Front 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 Change 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 Change
Placer 2,034.8 1,872.5 1,275.4 1,337.8 -34% 286.1 355.2 211.5 192.5 -33%
Butte 1,465.7 1,802.6 1,602.6 1,441.0 -2% 222.9 313.5 342.0 395.1 +77%
Yuba/Sutter 2,040.5 1,858.4 1,515.5 1,306.0 -36% 361.7 424.6 405.6 297.7 -18%
    Sutter 2,134.0 1,842.2 1,575.9 1,596.7 -25% 412.6 427.0 426.2 382.1 -7%
    Yuba 1,940.7 1,877.0 1,440.5 953.1 -51% 307.4 421.8 380.1 195.3 -36%
Yolo 2,784.0 1,864.5 1,796.3 1,770.4 -36% 424.6 438.2 427.8 432.4 +2%
El Dorado 1,670.3 1,458.3 1,062.4 824.3 -51% 241.0 283.6 198.2 137.2 -43%
Shasta 3,736.8 3,084.3 2,165.4 1,428.5 -62% 640.1 687.5 496.8 282.1 -56%
Nevada 2,313.7 2,143.9 1,758.5 1,337.5 -42% 236.6 349.6 407.1 296.6 +25%
Tehama 1,254.0 1,651.2 1,311.5 1,318.9 +5% 126.4 285.4 278.0 249.3 +97%
Front total 2,232.8 1,980.6 1,547.4 1,349.1 -40% 340.4 402.7 336.0 279.0 -18%
Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health 2,788.2 2,376.0 1,718.2 1,523.3 -45% 543.1 568.8 424.6 405.2 -25%
California 2,697.1 2,084.2 1,434.2 1,369.2 -49% 627.2 541.8 376.2 362.3 -42%
Sources: Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009; Demographic Research Unit, 2010.
which has a much higher juvenile incarceration rate.  
Solano, which has the second highest rate of incarcera-
tion, is the only county to experience a recent increase  
in juvenile crime. Of the 132 urban Sierra Health youth 
in state facilities in 2009, 39 were referred from adult 
institutions.
Sierra front counties
In many respects, the nine counties in the foothills and 
western Sierra Front range represent the most interesting 
cases. These counties have experienced explosive popula-
tion growth, with total populations up 43%, including  
a 51% increase in youth populations since 1990. This  
area is one of the few to experience large growth in  
white youth populations, even as its nonwhite share of 
youths jumped from 21% in 1990 to 31% in 2009 
(Demographic Research Unit, 2010).
In general, the faster a county’s population grows, the 
larger its crime declines. The Front county leader is Placer, 
whose total population doubled and youth population 
rose even faster by 220% since 1990. Placer’s gold-rush-
sized youth explosion since 1990 is unbelievable. The 
population of white 10- to 17-year-olds went up 186%, 
black up 192%, Hispanic up 425% and Asian up 500%. 
Most of the growth has occurred in the lower-elevation, 
eastern Sacramento exurbs such as Roseville and Rocklin, 
with considerable increases in the Auburn foothill areas 
along Highway 49. Equally remarkable, Placer crime rates 
have plunged since 1990, led by massive drops in juvenile 
felonies and violent crime and continued low juvenile  
incarceration levels (Table 9). Complications emerge 
when issues such as drug arrests, race and gender are 
broken down, and what such cataclysmic demographic 
change does to juvenile justice systems will be scrutinized 
in more detail.
The experiences of these counties are sharply divergent, 
with very different trends and rates in juvenile crime and 
incarceration (Tables 9, 10). Juvenile crime trends (par-
ticularly for violent offenses) in Butte, Nevada, Tehama 
and Yuba counties differ distinctly from those in Placer, 
El Dorado, Sutter, Shasta and Yolo. Together, the Front 
counties had 576 board-certified beds in juvenile facilities 
(451 in halls, 125 in camps), with 479 or 83.2% occu-
pied as of July 2008, and no youth released early for lack 
of space. Overall, incarceration levels are very similar in 
the Front counties to those in the rest of the region and 
statewide, with those in Tehama and Shasta considerably 
higher than in El Dorado and Placer. An unusually high 
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level of state imprisonments of Front area juveniles  
(18 of 41) are held on behalf of adult facilities. Once 
again, no clear pattern can be discerned between youth 
incarceration levels and crime levels or trends.
mountain/rural counties
This set of 13 counties is comprised of slower-growing 
rural, mostly higher foothill counties, including those east 
of the divide, as well as a couple of smaller Sacramento 
Valley and Coast Range counties. Few of these have popu-
lation centers larger than towns; the biggest, Susanville 
(Lassen), has only 18,000 people. Since 1990, these coun-
ties have experienced only modest population growth  
(up 19%), with a 10% increase in youth populations,  
indicating an aging demographic. Their juvenile crime 
rates have declined more slowly for felonies and have 
risen for violent crime since 1990, though this may be 
the result of delayed change and small numbers. Both 
violence and felony rates have fallen sharply since the late 
1990s (Table 11). In any case, Mountain county juvenile 
crime rates still remain below those of other Sierra Health 
counties and the state as a whole.
As with Front counties, Mountain counties show very 
different levels of and trends in youth crime, which are 
partially artifacts of small numbers (a few extra youth 
arrested due to unusual circumstances or campaigns can 
change Alpine’s or Modoc’s rates quickly, as an anoma-
lous surge in arrests in the latter county in 2009 shows). 
In sparsely populated counties, changes in policing, such 
as special campaigns against assault or drugs or tourist 
crime, can have distinct effects independent of genuine 
local crime trends.
The 13 Mountain counties have 174 board-certified beds 
in juvenile facilities (108 in halls, 66 in camps), with 136 
or 78.2% of which were occupied as of July 2008, and 
no transfers to other counties or early releases for lack 
of space reported. Major divergences appear for juvenile 
incarceration (Table 12). For example, Trinity, Lassen, 
Glenn and Siskiyou have higher rates of incarceration  
associated with generally mixed trends in crime;  
Tuolumne and Calaveras report no youth behind bars 
and experienced increases in youth crime; Mono and  
Plumas incarcerate no juveniles and have had large  
declines in youth crime to low levels. Of the six  
Mountain county youth in state facilities, none were 
referred by adult institutions. 
TAble 10  |  Incarcerations per 100,000 youth by facility type
Front	 State	and	Local	 Total	 DJJ	 DAI	 Total	 Camps	 Halls
Placer** 153.2 19.5 9.8 9.8 133.7 4.4 129.3
Yuba/Sutter 321.1 47.1 17.1 30.0 274.0 98.5 175.6
    Sutter  61.5 23.1 38.5  
    Yuba  29.0 9.7 19.3  
Butte 227.3 21.4 17.2 4.3 205.8 0.0 205.8
Yolo 361.1 18.3 4.6 13.7 342.8 0.0 342.8
El Dorado** 263.0 9.6 9.6 0.0 253.4 65.4 188.0
Shasta 404.2 39.0 29.2 9.7 365.2 131.5 233.8
Nevada 221.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 211.0 0.0 211.0
Tehama 452.2 28.3 14.1 14.1 423.9 0.0 423.9
Front total 272.7 24.4 13.7 10.7 248.3 36.8 211.5
Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health 270.4 29.7 20.3 9.5 240.7 62.2 178.5
California 281.9 35.3 28.2 7.1 246.6 97.9 148.7
*State incarcerations are in DJJ facilities and include youth sent from juvenile courts (DJJ) and held for adult institutions (DAI).
 **Placer and El Dorado house a few youth in the Fouts Springs facility in Colusa County.
Sources: Corrections Standards Authority, 2010; Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009; Division of Juvenile Justice, 2010a.
State	facilities*,	2009	 																																						Local	facilities,	2008
Operate joint juvenile facility
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TAble 11  |  Arrests per 100,000 population age 10-17, Mountain/Rural counties, 1990-2009
 
   Felonies       Violent crime
Mountain 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 Change 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 Change
Tuolumne 1,524.5 1,856.8 1,880.4 1,879.4 +23% 78.4 293.4 261.3 230.0 +193%
Siskiyou 2,330.9 2,166.6 1,286.8 1,411.2 -39% 243.5 457.1 285.5 294.0 +21%
Calaveras 1,492.5 1,066.4 1,222.2 1,550.3 +4% 156.2 187.1 328.3 389.7 +150%
Glenn 2,496.7 1,823.8 1,579.4 1,286.3 -48% 324.6 284.4 366.8 253.0 -22%
Amador 1,058.3 1,239.2 848.1 852.0 -19% 180.0 245.7 151.5 198.3 +10%
Lassen 1,930.8 2,302.4 1,522.4 1,167.3 -40% 260.3 560.0 436.5 255.7 -2%
Colusa 878.7 1,416.8 535.2 788.0 -10% 184.5 324.1 157.0 233.0 +26%
Plumas 2,036.1 2,671.2 1,773.0 1,289.2 -37% 360.9 442.4 331.9 189.6 -47%
Trinity 1,699.7 2,197.5 1,460.7 754.5 -56% 184.1 556.2 349.6 230.2 +25%
Mono 2,058.7 1,746.6 1,447.7 454.4 -78% 107.4 398.3 165.4 85.2 -21%
Modoc 338.8 378.4 196.3 851.8 +151% 17.8 0.0 65.4 102.2 +473%
Sierra 4,156.9 3,104.1 1,379.6 680.3 -84% 585.5 334.3 222.5 113.4 -81%
Alpine 1,675.0 2,661.6 1,744.2 759.0 -55% 167.5 0.0 290.7 0.0 -100%
Mountain total 1,752.5 1,787.0 1,333.7 1,245.9 -29% 203.1 342.5 280.3 247.3 22%
Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health 2,788.2 2,376.0 1,718.2 1,523.3 -45% 543.1 568.8 424.6 405.2 -25%
California 2,697.1 2,084.2 1,434.2 1,369.2 -49% 627.2 541.8 376.2 362.3 -42%
TAble 12 |  Incarcerations per 100,000 youth by facility type
	 	 																				State,	2009*	 	 																	Local,	2008
Mountain	 State	and	Local	 Total	 DJJ	 DAI	 Total	 Camps	 Halls
Tuolumne 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Siskiyou 450.1 22.5 22.5 0.0 427.6 0.0 427.6
Calaveras 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Glenn 460.0 81.2 81.2 0.0 378.8 0.0 378.8
Amador** 27.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.7 27.7 0.0
Lassen 493.0 29.0 29.0 0.0 464.0 0.0 464.0
Colusa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Plumas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trinity 1,306.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,306.7 412.7 894.1
Mono 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Modoc 88.8 88.8 88.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sierra 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Alpine 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mountain total 219.4 18.0 18.0 0.0 201.4 15.0 186.4
Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health 270.4 29.7 20.3 9.5 240.7 62.2 178.5
California 281.9 35.3 28.2 7.1 246.6 97.9 148.7
*State incarcerations are in DJJ facilities and include youth sent from juvenile courts (DJJ) and held for adult institutions (DAI).
**Amador houses a few youth in the Fouts Springs facility in Colusa County.
Source: Corrections Standards Authority, 2010; Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009; Division of Juvenile Justice, 2010a.
Sources: Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009; Demographic Research Unit, 2010.
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Factors Affecting Juvenile  
Incarceration
Patterns of juvenile arrest reveal a great deal about  
local youth trends and policing priorities (which may be 
only marginally related), both holding implications for 
the juvenile justice system. The Sierra Health counties 
show some striking, potentially informative patterns. As 
expected, rural counties show lower overall rates of arrest 
than more urbanized ones (Table 13). However, overall 
trends mask diverging demographic patterns.
juvenile crime rates by race and Gender
As depicted in Table 13, white, Asian and female youth 
have higher felony arrest rates in more rural areas, while 
male, black and, less consistently, Hispanic youth show 
decreased rates. The “Asian” youth category in rural  
counties includes high proportions of Native Americans, 
unfortunately combined in crime statistics. Remarkably, 
in the Mountain counties, as well as four of the nine 
Front counties, Hispanic youth show lower arrest rates 
than white youth, which is decidedly not the case for 
Hispanic youth in urban counties or statewide. Black 
youth show 6-1 higher felony rates than white youth in 
Urban counties, but just 2-1 in Mountain counties. This 
2-1 ratio is based on nine felony arrests among 350 black 
youth in the 13 Mountain counties. Similarly, the male to 
female arrest ratio falls from almost 6-1 in Urban counties 
to 3-1 in Rural areas, with the latter showing larger  
increases in female arrests.
Examining assault and drug offenses, two large arrest 
categories likely to highlight disparities, using both felony 
and misdemeanor data, offers some illumination. Assault 
arrest rates show an odd, U-shaped pattern for both sexes 
and for whites and Asians, with considerably higher levels 
for these two races in Mountain than in Urban counties. 
TAble 13  |  Arrests per 100,000 population age 10-17 by race and gender, 2008
 Total       White     Hispanic Black Asian Male Female
Felony arrest rate
Urban 1,588.6 926.9 1,463.0 5,997.8 841.2 2,661.0 495.8
Front 1,310.1 1,176.3 1,534.5 5,623.1 1,075.9 2,066.6 521.5
Mountain 1,284.1 1,363.7 947.3 2,597.5 1,311.7 1,934.9 582.3
Sierra Health 1,493.4 1,060.3 1,457.4 5,947.4 888.8 2,451.4 507.8
California 1,410.0 893.6 1,494.9 4,936.5 662.3 2,287.7 492.1
Assault	arrest	rate	(felony	and	misdemeanor)
Urban 1,092.0 627.7 1,080.0 3,989.7 498.7 1,513.0 663.0
Front 794.2 703.1 911.8 5,143.6 459.8 1,136.5 437.4
Mountain 939.7 979.8 757.8 2,597.5 787.0 1,214.9 642.9
Sierra Health 999.9 686.2 1,034.6 4,043.3 498.9 1,389.5 599.1
California 685.6 455.2 734.6 2,294.6 295.0 961.8 396.8
Drug	arrest	rate	(felony	and	misdemeanor)
Urban 409.9 326.0 447.8 1,000.1 152.6 690.0 119.4
Front 625.9 661.8 520.3 1,830.8 349.4 988.9 247.5
Mountain 595.3 659.9 446.6 1,154.4 131.2 770.6 406.4
Sierra Health 480.9 484.8 462.0 1,048.5 183.3 779.0 170.9
California 474.1 478.2 487.8 900.5 207.9 785.5 148.4
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009.
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TAble 14  |  Changes in juvenile felony rates by demographic group, 1999-2008
 
 Total White Hispanic Black Asian Male Female
Urban	counties
1999 2,250.8 1,643.4 2,332.1 5,490.8 1,708.0 3,701.6 708.9
2008 1,588.6 926.9 1,463.0 5,997.8 841.2 2,661.0 495.8
Change -29% -44% -37% +9% -51% -28% -30%
Front counties
1999 1,783.4 1,802.4 1,680.8 4,175.9 1,358.4 2,877.5 623.9
2008 1,310.1 1,176.3 1,534.5 5,623.1 1,075.9 2,066.6 521.5
Change -27% -35% -9% +35% -21% -28% -16%
Mountain counties
1999 1,565.7 1,703.8 936.1 1,437.7 1,642.3 2,443.3 551.9
2008 1,284.1 1,363.7 947.3 2,597.5 1,311.7 1,934.9 582.3
Change -18% -20% +1% +81% -20% -21% +6%
All Sierra Health counties
1999 2,066.0 1,709.4 2,125.0 5,336.5 1,636.6 3,369.7 673.3
2008 1,493.4 1,060.3 1,457.4 5,947.4 888.8 2,451.4 507.8
Change -28% -38% -31% +11% -46% -27% -25%
California
1999 1,728.9 1,328.4 1,736.7 4,551.4 1,174.3 2,824.7 564.7
2008 1,410.0 893.6 1,494.9 4,936.5 662.3 2,287.7 492.1
Change -18% -33% -14% +8% -44% -19% -13%
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009.
Conversely, Hispanic and black youth show very low 
assault rates in Mountain counties, though more erratic 
black patterns may be artifacts of smaller numbers in 
rural areas. The much higher assault rate for black youth 
in Front counties, however, is based on a fairly substan-
tial population of 2,300 youth and may relate to the 
distribution of black youth in these counties in isolated 
districts in suburban areas. The result is that white, 
Asian and female youth show higher arrest rates in Sierra 
Health counties than their statewide counterparts, while 
the reverse is true for other demographics.
Drug arrests, which tend to track shifting policing priori-
ties, might be expected to have higher rates in Urban 
counties, the sites of much perceived drug dealer violence 
and gang activity. Yet, these show an erratic pattern, with 
very high rates for females in Mountain counties and 
higher levels in Front counties for other demographics. 
In both Front and Mountain counties, female drug arrest 
levels vary radically, with levels higher than for males in  
a few Mountain areas. In turn, Front and Mountain  
counties show inconsistent patterns, with Calaveras and 
Butte counties showing much higher levels than Placer, 
Sutter and Plumas.   
What features of the various Front and Mountain coun-
ties contribute to higher arrest levels for white, Asian and 
female youth, demographics that elsewhere in California 
have low arrest rates? The higher poverty rates of white 
and Asian youth in the Urban counties may be a factor in 
their somewhat higher than average arrest levels, but the 
mystery is why these rates escalate rather than diminish in 
Front and Rural counties, especially for drug offenses.
Table 14 explores trends over the last decade using the 
Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s detailed county figures 
for 1999-2008. Unfortunately, these are not as reliable, 
often reflecting changes in small numbers in the smaller 
counties. In general, Urban counties, like those statewide, 
have experienced major declines in crime among all youth 
demographics except blacks. Front counties show a  
similar pattern, with the large numbers of new white 
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and, to a lesser extent, new Hispanic immigrants to those 
counties showing lower crime rates than their counter-
parts of a decade ago. Mountain counties show decreased 
white arrest rates and stable rates for Hispanics, with 
females comprising a larger share of arrests today than 
in 1999. It is likely that 2009 arrest data, which show a 
large juvenile crime decline statewide and will be available 
for individual counties soon, will show larger declines in 
youth crime.
incarceration of Pre-disposition Youth  
and Lesser arrestees
One way to reduce juvenile detention and conserve space 
in juvenile halls and camps is to reduce the incarceration 
of youth who have not been adjudicated, who are being 
held for minor offenses, such as misdemeanors and status 
arrests, or for non-offenses like dependency, neglect or 
abuse. Due to forces not entirely clear, the percentage of 
non-adjudicated youth being held in local juvenile facili-
ties has risen statewide over the last decade. As Table 15 
shows, Urban Sierra Health counties have considerably 
worse records in terms of incarcerating higher propor-
tions of non-adjudicated youth, as well as increases in 
that category over the last decade. Meanwhile, Front and 
Mountain counties use considerably lower proportions  
of local facility space for non-adjudicated youth and, con-
trary to statewide trends, Front counties have decreased 
their proportions of non-adjudicated youth being held.
However, Front counties incarcerate considerably more 
youth for misdemeanors than other areas, though the 
felony proportion has risen sharply in recent years.  
Counties across the state can reduce juvenile incarceration 
by replacing a holdover from the past—the higher pro-
portions of girls than boys incarcerated for misdemeanors 
and non-offenses—with modern, equalized standards 
for males and females. Placer, Tehama, Trinity, Yolo and 
Yuba/Sutter show the most egalitarian trends and levels in 
holding only adjudicated youth, regardless of gender, over 
the last decade; Stanislaus has the best trends among the 
Urban counties. Butte, Stanislaus and Yolo counties have 
particularly good records with regard to felonies, with 
high proportions of their incarcerated youth of both sexes 
detained on serious rather than minor charges.
TAble 15  |  Changes in percentages of youth in local facilities who are post-disposition  
and felony arrestees
 99-01 02-05 06-08 Change 99-01 02-05 06-08 Change 99-01 02-05 06-08 Change
           Percent who are post-disposition, both sexes                 Male             Female
Urban 56.5% 53.5% 51.5% -9% 57.6% 54.8% 52.0% -10% 49.8% 46.1% 47.5% -5%
Front 51.2% 58.4% 62.0% +21% 53.3% 59.1% 63.6% +19% 41.9% 55.8% 54.9% +31%
Mountain 71.9% 68.0% 64.5% -10% 72.8% 68.7% 65.3% -10% 65.3% 64.2% 59.4% -9%
Sierra Health 56.7% 57.0% 56.3% -1% 58.4% 58.4% 57.2% -2% 46.8% 49.8% 50.3% 8%
California 70.0% 66.4% 63.3% -10% 71.1% 67.2% 64.1% -10% 62.9% 62.2% 58.4% -7%
       Percent who are felony arrestees, both sexes                 Male             Female
Urban 58.9% 62.2% 68.7% +17% 62.4% 64.8% 70.9% +14% 39.3% 47.8% 52.7% +34%
Front 47.8% 52.8% 59.5% +25% 51.0% 56.8% 63.1% +24% 30.6% 37.0% 41.4% +35%
Mountain 67.4% 66.9% 69.3% +3% 69.2% 69.7% 71.8% +4% 54.7% 50.8% 53.3% -3%
Sierra Health 56.3% 60.4% 65.7% +17% 59.6% 63.7% 68.4% +15% 37.3% 43.4% 47.4% +27%
California 66.2% 65.9% 68.9% +4% 68.2% 68.8% 71.4% +5% 52.6% 49.9% 52.8% +0%
Source: Corrections Standards Authority, 2010; Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 2009.
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Length of Stay in facilities and Use of treatment
Table 16 shows that counties vary considerably in the 
length of time youth spend in juvenile facilities. The 
large range from 71 days in San Joaquin to 217 days 
in Sacramento* for camp releases, and from 16 days 
in Lassen to 62 days in Yolo for hall releases, offers the 
possibility to study what contributes to long juvenile 
confinements that are characteristic of detention camps 
in particular.
The CDCR reports that one-fifth of youth incarcerated 
statewide and in Sierra Health counties have diagnosed 
mental health disorders, and one in 12 is on psychotro-
pic medication (Corrections Standards Authority, 2010, 
online query survey tabulations). These numbers fall 
below estimates of outside experts, a discrepancy noted 
during the Farrell litigation. Although Sierra Health 
counties are reasonably similar in terms of proportions 
of mental health clients, they vary sharply in the propor-
tions on medication. Whether more intensive efforts to 
diagnose and treat mental health disorders hold promise 
to reduce or modify juvenile detention rates, or whether 
such efforts might increase numbers of youth detained 
under psychiatric orders is subject to some controversy.
While county prosecutors generally use direct files of 
juvenile cases in adult criminal court less than those 
statewide, two Front counties, Yuba and Yolo, have  
considerably higher proportions. The relationship  
between direct files, presumably reserved for the most 
serious and violent offenses, and incarceration levels is 
worth exploring (Macallair, D., McCracken, C. and  
Teji, S., 2011).
Use of alternatives to confinement
Sierra Health counties make some use of alternatives  
to facility incarceration, such as home confinement 
monitored by electronic surveillance or more casual  
supervisions (Table 17). The large Urban counties 
use these devices for some post-disposition cases. San 
Joaquin reported 72 youths monitored electronically in 
June 2008, followed by Sacramento with 33, Stanislaus 
with 31 and Solano with 16. Curiously, home deten-
tion is used more for pre-disposition cases. San Joaquin 
Source: Corrections Standards Authority, 2010. 
TAble 16 | Selected adult-court, mental health 
and length-of-stay characteristics, June 2008
County Adult Court  Total   Medicated Halls Camps
Urban
Sacramento 1.5% 14.8% 4.0% 22.2 217.0
San Joaquin 1.3% 26.4% 4.7% 21.0 71.0
Stanislaus 1.7% 48.7% 15.1% 24.3 
Solano 3.1% 6.8% 9.9% 12.3 88.8
Urban	 1.7%	 22.5%	 6.7%	 21.1	 184.5
Front
Placer 0.9% 14.7% 8.3% 21.3 
Yuba/Sutter 9.3% 18.7% 10.7% 22.1 102.0
Butte 3.0% 19.7% 19.7% 25.0 
Yolo 8.0% 28.0% 4.0% 62.2 85.0
El Dorado 0.0% 18.5% 10.9% 21.0 164.0
Shasta 0.0% 11.5% 11.5% 20.0 87.0
Nevada 0.0% 15.4% 15.4% 16.0 
Tehama 0.0% 17.6% 5.9% 30.2 
Front 2.9% 18.0% 10.2% 30.1 107.2
Mountain
Tuolumne 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Siskiyou 0.0% 17.2% 24.1% 40.3 
Calaveras     
Glenn 4.2% 4.2% 8.3% 15.0 
Amador 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Lassen 0.0% 17.4% 26.1% 16.1 
Colusa 0.0%    
Plumas     
Trinity 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 45.0 unk
Mono 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Modoc     
Sierra 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Alpine     
Mountain 0.6% 10.5% 13.4% 29.0 
Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health 1.9% 20.3% 8.2% 24.7 173.9
California 2.4% 20.1% 8.2% 24.6 122.1
Average length of
stay	(days),	releases
              Percent of cases involving           
Direct files to Mental health cases 
*This camp closed in 2010.
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reported 68 cases, Sacramento 33, Stanislaus 29, Solano 
19, Placer 22, El Dorado 15 and Siskiyou 7. The propor-
tion of juvenile detention cases employing home confine-
ment ranges from 12% in Sacramento to one-third in 
San Joaquin and nearly 40% in Placer. Other counties 
rarely use home confinement.
Whether home detention and alternative supervision 
can reduce juvenile facility incarceration requires more 
intensive study of counties that frequently employ these 
techniques. Preliminary figures indicate that counties 
such as Placer with high proportions of youthful arrestees 
subjected to home and alternative supervisions do not 
suffer higher rates or worsened trends in juvenile offend-
ing compared to low-alternative counties such as Nevada, 
Yuba/Sutter or Yolo. Tuolumne reports relying predomi-
nantly on unspecified alternative supervisions for the 
seven youth in its system.
Finally, handling of younger offenders varies consider-
ably. About 15% of Sierra Health county youth in hall 
detention and 7% in camp detention are under age 15, a 
slightly higher overall proportion than statewide. About 
14% of the four Urban county incarcerated youth are un-
der age 15, compared to 13% in Front counties and 4% 
in Mountain counties. Factors leading to less incarcera-
tion of the youngest offenders in counties such as Yolo, 
Nevada, Siskiyou, Lassen and Glenn, and higher rates in 
Butte and Shasta, would be worthwhile to contrast.
Counties Recommended for  
Attention/Site Visits
The wide, sometimes extreme variations in Sierra Health 
counties’ handling of juvenile offenders may to some ex-
tent reflect differing crime structures. Sacramento, which 
accounts for half of all juvenile homicide arrests in the 26 
counties, would be expected to have a higher proportion 
of youth in secure confinement than the Front counties, 
whose similar population of youth account for just 15% 
of juvenile homicides in the region. But in other respects, 
county differences can illuminate which counties have 
found ways to reduce youth incarceration, beginning with 
younger and lower-level offenders and those requiring  
alternative treatments, that could benefit other jurisdic-
tions. Conversely, counties that incarcerate large numbers 
of youth, particularly marginal offenders, without tangible 
benefits offer the opposite example. Counties can be  
chosen to reflect various dimensions of juvenile justice.  
A few recommendations follow.
Stanislaus: Large urban county with high rate of 
youth poverty and large proportion of youth of color. 
Along with massive Hispanic population growth, 
especially in the Modesto area, the county retains low 
incarceration rates, lower than average juvenile crime 
rates—including for violent crime—and juvenile 
crime shows larger than average declines over the  
last two decades. Interesting to contrast with  
Sacramento, a higher-incarceration county with  
similar crime levels.
Placer: Perhaps the most intriguing county, with 
among the largest population increases in the nation 
along with rapid racial diversification and urbaniza-
tion, allowing analysis of a juvenile justice system in 
flux. Placer was the wealthiest of the Sierra Health 
counties in 1999, whether this is true now awaits 
new census figures. Yet, amid its doubled population, 
Placer shows very large declines in crime, especially 
homicide, led by large drops in every type of juvenile 
crime and now has among the lowest juvenile violent 
crime rates of any major county. Further, Placer  
reduced its youth incarceration level over the last  
decade, at least partly through relying on various  
levels of home rather than facility detention, to a level 
well below the state average. El Dorado and Shasta 
counties show similar demographic and crime trends, 
but employ higher rates of juvenile incarceration.
Mono: Another anomaly. A formerly isolated, desert 
county, Mono has seen unusually large youth popula-
tion growth, particularly Hispanic, concentrated in 
the Mammoth recreation area. Suddenly, half the 
county’s youth population is now of color. The coun-
ty has experienced very large declines in overall crime, 
but still has a higher than average crime rate among 
adults. However, juvenile crime has fallen rapidly 
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Source: Corrections Standards Authority, 2010. 
TAble 17  |  Breakdown of types of facility, home and alternative confinements  
of juveniles, June 2008
    Alternative 
County  Total in system DJJ Halls Camps Monitored Other confinement
Urban
Sacramento 649 7.7% 45.9% 34.1% 5.1% 7.2% 0.0%
San Joaquin 379 9.2% 48.0% 10.0% 17.9% 14.8% 0.0%
Stanislaus 232 13.4% 61.6% 0.0% 12.5% 12.5% 0.0%
Solano* 184 6.5% 48.9% 28.3% 10.3% 6.0% 0.0%
Urban	total	 1,422	 9.0%	 50.1%	 21.9%	 10.5%	 10.1%	 0.0%
Front
Placer 111 6.3% 54.1% 1.8% 19.8% 18.0% 0.0%
Yuba/Sutter 75 6.7% 64.0% 29.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Butte 66 15.2% 78.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.1%
Yolo 100 1.0% 82.0% 0.0% 4.0% 13.0% 0.0%
El Dorado 94 0.0% 68.1% 16.0% 16.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Shasta 113 12.4% 43.4% 27.4% 0.0% 13.3% 3.5%
Nevada 26 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Tehama 34 5.9% 94.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Front total 619 6.3% 66.7% 11.3% 6.6% 7.8% 1.3%
Mountain
Tuolumne 7 28.6% 0.0% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 42.9%
Siskiyou 29 10.3% 65.5% 0.0% 24.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Calaveras 0      
Glenn 24 20.8% 70.8% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Amador 2 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Lassen 23 21.7% 78.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Colusa* 1 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Plumas 0      
Trinity 23 4.3% 69.6% 26.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Mono 1 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Modoc 0      
Sierra 3 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0%
Alpine 0      
Mountain total 113 16.8% 61.9% 6.2% 12.4% 0.0% 2.7%
 Sierra Health counties and state totals
Sierra Health 2,154 8.6% 55.5% 18.0% 9.5% 8.9% 0.5%            
California 16,309 11.5% 44.2% 27.2% 10.7% 4.6%  1.8%
*Colusa’s rate is inflated, and Solano’s reduced, by Solano’s use of Colusa’s Fouts Springs Camp.
                                    Percentages of juveniles in:
          Facilities                                      Home supervision  
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to levels well below average. Its arrest rate for white 
youth is double that for Hispanics (the latter have the 
lowest Hispanic arrest rates in the state), indicating 
that the quadrupling in Hispanic youth numbers is 
associated with reduced crime. Mono reports incar-
cerating no youth in either state or local facilities for 
at least the last decade. As with Placer, Mono has 
multiple peculiarities worth investigating.
Yuba/Sutter: Interesting because these counties 
jointly operate a juvenile hall. Together the two 
counties, despite high poverty levels and population 
surges, have average rates of juvenile crime and incar-
ceration, both of which are down in recent years. All 
the detained youth in their system are held in facili-
ties. These counties may serve as general examples of 
Sierra/Valley trends and can be contrasted with Yolo,  
a high incarceration county that relies on a greater 
mix of detention and supervision, including both 
facility and home, with more mixed results. Yolo’s 
use, if any, of its dominant major state university, 
UC Davis, as a resource for its juvenile justice system 
would be interesting to study.
Solano: Solano operates the Fouts Springs camp in 
Colusa County, a wilderness “boot camp” but  
apparently not a militaristic one, which houses youth 
from a number of counties. Fouts is intriguing from 
an institutional standpoint, especially the potential 
for youth conservation work, and considerable his-
tory is available online. Solano incarcerates youth at 
a level second only to Sacramento and has not shown 
as impressive a decline in juvenile crime as other  
Urban counties. Because Fouts houses youth from 
other jurisdictions, studying it would yield insights 
into Colusa’s, El Dorado’s, Placer’s, Amador’s and  
Yolo’s systems, as well as Solano’s, on the use of  
DJJ options.
Trinity: A rural, overwhelmingly white, high-poverty, 
high-incarceration county that, despite its small size, 
operates both a juvenile camp and a hall. The county 
shows a considerable decline in overall youth crime  
to very low levels along with an anomalous increase  
in violence arrests (though numbers are small) in  
recent years.
Plumas: A very rural, overwhelmingly white, high-
poverty, zero-incarceration county that shows large 
declines in juvenile crime of all kinds, though its 
felony rate remains average. Interesting to contrast 
with Trinity, since Plumas reports incarcerating no 
youth. Plumas could be contrasted with Tuolumne, 
which reports using predominantly alternative  
detentions.
Shasta: Local officials continually claim a metham-
phetamine crisis, but it is not reflected in juvenile 
crime or incarceration trends. Shasta is a fast-grow-
ing, largely white, high-poverty county with large 
declines in every type of juvenile crime and generally 
higher than average, though falling, juvenile incar-
ceration levels. Like Placer, El Dorado, Butte and 
Nevada, Shasta’s growth is due both to white flight 
from cities and Hispanic influx, and its adult (but 
not juvenile) violent crime rate appears to have risen 
considerably. Shasta also has among the highest  
female juvenile arrest rates, especially for drugs. 
Shasta operates both a camp and hall and has a con-
siderably higher youth incarceration level than Placer 
and most other counties, though it has experimented 
with alternative detention methods.
Study Plan
Once a set of counties is chosen for special attention, 
their juvenile justice statistics can be collected for  
contrast. The statistical features, in turn, can be used  
as the basis for local inquiries and site visits to see how  
the numbers translate into practices. The objective is to 
discover what techniques appear associated with specific 
outcomes, such as lower levels of juvenile offending, for 
recommendation to other counties.
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Section iV includes information on the following topics:
• Systems should avoid the iatrogenic effect that results from  
unnecessary interventions
• Interventions targeting high-risk offenders are more effective  
and efficient
County probation departments are central 
to all juvenile justice services and reform. 
Judges rely on the discernment of probation 
officers and they have the earliest direct  
contact with youth apart from the arresting 
officer. In a healthy county-level juvenile  
justice system, probation officers act as  
neutral, supervising agents who have access 
to a wide array of interventions and choose  
those best-suited to an individual youth. 
In order to best utilize limited funding and 
resources, the small percentage of youth  
offenders who are responsible for the  
majority of youth crimes should be targeted 
for comprehensive intervention.
   s e c t I o n  I v
Planning for a 21st Century  
Juvenile Justice System
reformIng the calIfornIa juvenIle justIce system 
begins with county probation systems. Since the dawn of the juvenile 
court, probation has been the backbone of the state’s juvenile justice 
system. Founded on the principle of individualized justice, no other 
component of the system offers the potential for realizing this vision.
As the court’s neutral agent responsible for gathering background  
information on youth, probation officers occupy a powerful and 
unique role. The information gathered on each youth is assembled into 
a disposition report that constitutes the single most influential docu-
ment in the adjudication process. As previously noted, judges rely on 
the recommendation of the probation officer in 90% of the cases.
If the youth is adjudicated delinquent for a felony, he or she is  
normally placed on formal probation and sent home under probation 
supervision. In less than 1% of California delinquency cases, a youth 
is sent to the DJJ. If the youth is not sent to a group home or a county 
ranch or camp, he or she is under the jurisdiction of the probation  
department.
From its inception, the supervision responsibility of the probation  
department is widely deemed its most critical function. It is through 
the option of community supervision that a youth is spared being 
removed from the home. Unfortunately, one of probation’s historic 
failures is its inability to deliver the range of services necessary to  
effect change in the lives of youth. Founded under a casework model 
of service delivery, probation officers had the unrealistic expectation 
to provide an entire array of interventions, service referrals and com-
munity supervision. Lacking the resources, probation services became 
little more than a perfunctory endeavor that emphasized sporadic 
office visits and minimum community treatment (Norman and Allen, 
1954; Champion, 2004).
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In California, many probation systems failed to develop 
proper techniques for community supervision and instead 
became dependent on the use of short-term detention 
and/or institutional care. A healthy county-level juvenile 
justice system includes a probation department with  
access to a wide array of intervention options and services 
that are utilized to the fullest extent possible.
Use Caution with Early Intervention
Limited resources have been exacerbated by conflicting 
intervention philosophies. In recent years, much atten-
tion has been devoted toward early intervention and  
preventive care. While this is an essential operating  
function for the child welfare system, prioritizing early 
intervention and preventive care in the juvenile justice 
system can be counterproductive. Utilizing limited 
resources for low-needs youth depletes the resources for 
high-needs youth. While the strategy of targeting youth 
during their initial involvement with the juvenile justice 
system appears reasonable and is sometimes politically 
popular, there is little evidence that this strategy is a good 
expenditure. Since 70% of all arrested youth never get  
arrested again, targeting first-time offender populations 
for priority intervention is a dubious use of resources  
(Siegel and Welsh, 2006). While many first-time offender  
programs cite low recidivism rates, there is reason to  
assume that many of the youth served in these programs 
would never be arrested again even if they never partici-
pated in such programs. While these programs often are 
founded on good intentions, the research suggests an 
iatrogenic artifact (Latessa and Lowenkamp, 2006).
There is little recognition of iatrogenesis in the juvenile 
justice system. Instead, practice literature has placed a 
great deal of faith on 
the benefits of interven-
tions without regard to 
the residual or invisible 
effects. Therefore, it is 
important that juvenile 
justice systems focus 
resources on the highest-
needs offenders (Latessa 
and Lowenkamp, 2006).
High-needs offenders are 
those who have frequent 
contacts with the juvenile 
justice system and whose  
life experiences or circum-
stances render them high 
risk for future delinquent 
behavior (Latessa and 
Lowenkamp, 2006).
Targeting Interventions
With limited resources in a period of shrinking budgets, 
effective juvenile justice systems must prioritize interven-
tions for the highest-risk offenders. The highest-risk  
offenders are youth who have multiple contacts with the 
juvenile justice system and exhibit characteristics  
associated with recidivism. These characteristics include 
broken or fragmented families or residing in high-crime 
neighborhoods with elevated rates of violence. In many 
Risk Factors Associated with  
Recidivism
•	Unhealthy	Family	Dynamics
•	Disorganized	Community	Environment
•	 Peer/Family	Criminality
•	 Low	Educational	Performance
•	Drug	and	Alcohol	Dependency
•	 Lack	of	Employment	Experience	and	Job	Skills
•	 Abuse	and	Neglect
•	 Poverty
•	 Chronic	Illnesses
•	Cognitive	and/or	Physical	Disabilities
•	Mental	Illnesses
•	Minority	Status
•	 Past	Criminal	History
•	 Having	Children	at	a	Young	Age
•	Homelessness
Sources: Britner et al., 2006, Greenwood, 1996, Mears and Travis, 2003, 
Unruh et al., 2009, Visher and Travis, 2003
Iatrogenesis
The terms iatrogenesis and iatro-
genic artifact refer to inadvertent 
adverse effects or complications 
caused by or resulting from medical 
treatment or advice. In addition to 
harmful consequences of actions 
by physicians, iatrogenesis also can 
refer to actions by other healthcare 
professionals, such as psychologists, 
therapists, pharmacists, nurses, 
dentists and others, traditional and 
nontraditional. 
Source: Merriam Webster Online 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
iatrogenesis
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instances these youth have family members, including 
parents, with multigenerational involvement in the  
criminal justice system, who see few avenues to a non-
criminal lifestyle. These deeply ensconced delinquent 
youth present some of the most vexing challenges to 
intervention, since they have few positive support  
systems and a plethora of criminogenic life circum- 
stances. Because of their long histories of juvenile justice 
system involvement, youth in this category quickly 
exhaust county probation system resources and patience, 
and eventually are selected for adult court transfer. More 
and more county district attorneys in California are uti-
lizing their discretion to directly file these cases in adult 
court once the youth reaches the age of 16 and has two  
or more sustained felony petitions.
Another category of high-risk youth who also have 
lengthy histories of child welfare and juvenile justice 
involvement are emotionally disturbed or mentally ill 
youth. Because of long histories of trauma due to abuse 
and neglect by adult caretakers, these youth exhibit vari-
ous forms of mental illness or emotional instability. They 
are difficult to serve due to their sometimes impulsive or 
defiant attitudes toward adult authority figures. When 
they commit delinquent acts and come into contact with 
the juvenile justice system, they often are labeled violent 
or aggressive and consigned to custodial institutional 
care. In a highly regimented custodial environment, 
such as a conventional detention center or correctional 
institution, the conditions of these youth often deterio-
rate, and they become resistant and combative. When a 
youth becomes combative, he or she is often subjected to 
harsher and more restrictive punitive treatment, which 
serves to only worsen the condition. Unfortunately, this is 
the plight of many mentally ill youth who end up in a  
juvenile justice system. Too often, over-extended or 
poorly functioning juvenile justice systems simply over-
look the needs of mentally ill youth and brand them as 
chronic or manipulative offenders.
Other categories of youth offenders include the occa-
sional or situational delinquent. These youth are normal 
functioning, but tend to engage in delinquent activity 
due to environmental influences, including peer and 
neighborhood factors. Youth growing up in high-crime 
or gang-ravaged communities are more likely to become 
identified delinquents than youth growing up in more 
sedate middle- or upper-middle-class neighborhoods. 
As a means of maintaining friends, building respect 
or satisfying recognition needs, these youth engage in 
delinquent behavior. Their delinquent behavior, however, 
is not the result of some internal disability that impairs 
their decision making. While these youth can become 
highly entrenched in a delinquent lifestyle, their transitory 
flirtation with delinquency also renders them particularly 
receptive to minimal intervention.
The class of offenders least in need of intervention is 
first- or second-time offenders. Most first- and second-
time offenders do not re-engage in delinquent behavior 
and therefore require no intervention. For many years, 
juvenile justice practitioners have argued for the creation 
of first-time offender programs for youth believed to be 
on a path to delinquency, or for those who come into 
contact with the juvenile justice system for the first time. 
One famous example of this type of programming is the 
Scared Straight program, where youth are taken into a 
state prison and subjected to threats and intimidation by 
menacing inmates. In California, the Squires Program at 
San Quentin State Prison provides youth with a sober  
description of prison life by longtime inmates. The pro-
gram is generally well regarded and is utilized by juvenile 
justice systems throughout the Bay Area.
While some of these programs can be useful and infor-
mative to many youth, they are not designed to impact 
high-end youth in the juvenile justice system. Instead they 
tend to focus on the class of delinquents or non-delin-
quents who would be unlikely to become involved in the 
juvenile justice system. Youth served by these programs 
are often the most likely to desist from delinquency with-
out formally imposed conditions or sanctions.
Programs that are designed to alter delinquent behavior 
by subjecting youth to threats or harsh treatment such as 
Scared Straight actually have the opposite effect. Studies 
show that these programs increase delinquency, and in 
some cases cause youth to mimic the various behaviors  
the programs are supposed to deter (Miller, 1998).
Systems reforms require that jurisdictions develop a  
coherent plan that targets limited resources on the  
population of youth who present the greatest societal 
threat and therefore warrant the highest level of inter- 
vention. Diverting resources to the population of least 
threatening youth diverts resources and potentially  
compromises public safety.
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In order for a juvenile justice system to be 
effective, it must be run on the principle of 
unconditional care, in effect meaning that  
no stone be left unturned in attempting to 
habilitate juvenile offenders and reintegrate 
them back into the community. A model  
juvenile justice system addresses the needs 
of the small percentage of high-needs  
youth who commit the majority of crimes, 
and who generally have been relinquished  
to state facilities with minimal expectation  
for recovery. Because these youth have  
numerous risk factors, they require a com-
prehensive system of care to help them 
recover and to avoid the trickle-down  
criminality, which is inevitable when youth 
are not given the necessary services and 
supports to become productive members  
of society. Strong centralized coordination  
of services is necessary to assure consistent 
outcomes.
    s e c t I o n  v 
Constructing a Model  
Juvenile Justice System for California
In order to utIlIze lImIted resources  to the fullest 
extent possible, it is necessary to use interventions strategically. The 
most effective approach for reforming juvenile justice is to target 
the population with the highest needs. Reform strategies that target 
low-end youth in the hope that evidence of success will translate into 
systemic change for the high-needs youth fail because they simply 
deplete limited resources and lead to harsher treatment for the needier 
population.
To achieve the greatest system-wide impact, effective juvenile justice 
reform prioritizes resources toward effective interventions for the 
highest-needs youth. When better intervention methods succeed with 
this population, the impact is more likely to trickle down and result in 
system-wide changes. It is for this reason that CJCJ argues strenuously 
for juvenile justice reform initiatives to focus primary attention on the 
system’s neediest populations.
Section V includes recommendations in line with the  
following topics:
• System-wide changes will be strongest if high-needs youth are  
targeted for intervention first
• A high percentage of youth in the juvenile justice system display 
behavioral and mental health issues
• Modern juvenile justice services must transcend traditional  
departmental boundaries to maximize access to a range of  
behavioral health and other services to ensure proper coordination
• Successful juvenile justice systems are based on habilitation and  
reintegration
• Effective systems of care break down the barriers among service 
providers to offer a complete spectrum of services to youth in need
• Coordinated case management is vital to guarantee comprehensive 
intervention and consistent outcomes
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Creating a System of Care for  
Special-Needs Youth
A high-impact strategy to reform juvenile justice in 
California begins with high-needs youth with behavioral 
health issues. Recent studies suggest that up to 70%  
of the juvenile justice population suffers from some  
form of mental health disorder; a number that was previ-
ously underestimated (Trupin and Patterson, 2003;  
Koppelman, 2005). These mental health issues confront 
the juvenile justice system with challenges it was not 
structured to address. As previously mentioned, the 
California juvenile justice system traditionally has utilized 
four dispositional options: home on formal probation, 
group-home placement, county-based ranches and camps 
and commitment to state correctional institutions. These 
options are inadequate to meet the treatment needs of 
special-needs youth (Koppleman, 2005;  Berkeley Center 
for Criminal Justice, 2010).
Special-needs youth often have extensive histories of  
system involvement beginning with the child welfare 
system. These youth often come from turbulent  
backgrounds with fractured and broken families and have 
received little nurturance from adult guardians. When 
they reach their teenage years, child welfare agencies are 
quick to abdicate responsibility for their care by transfer-
ring them to the juvenile justice system once the youth 
commits a delinquent act. Upon entering the juvenile  
justice system, the standard of care shifts from a focus on 
the child’s needs to a focus on behavior. Once in the  
juvenile justice system, special-needs youth often have 
access to fewer treatment resources, as system emphasis 
shifts to containing delinquent behavior (Koppleman, 
2005;  Berkeley Center for Criminal Justice, 2010).
Modern juvenile justice services must transcend tradi-
tional agency boundaries to maximize access to a range 
of behavioral health and other services and ensure proper 
coordination. Services provided by local providers should 
be community- and family-based. The long-term goal 
should be the reduction or elimination of congregate 
custodial institutions. Congregate custodial institutions 
represent the traditional correctional institution that is 
designed primarily for the efficient management of large 
numbers of youth in a confined area.
Designing a more effective juvenile justice system that 
targets special-needs youth requires borrowing from the 
successes of other human service fields and adopting 
proven innovations. Effective interventions intended to 
produce long-term changes in the individual behavior of 
high-risk and special-needs youth requires adherence to 
the goals of habilitation and reintegration.
Because many of the youth who enter the juvenile justice 
system suffer from long-term emotional damage and 
behavioral problems, the goal is not to return them  
to a pre-existing state, but to favorably reverse their  
previous behavioral patterns. Reversing previous behaviors 
and instilling new values and outlooks is a process known as 
habilitation.
Too often services, especially those that are residential or 
institution-based, are not designed to follow the youth 
back to the home or community upon release. The process 
of focusing resources on returning youth to their homes and 
community is called reintegration. The process of reinte-
gration begins immediately after youth enter the system 
and continues regardless of the nature of their placement. 
The entire focus of the intervention is on creating the 
conditions for a youth’s successful adjustment to life in 
the community.  Reintegration is most successful when 
it works to mitigate the risk factors in a youth’s life and 
to strengthen the protective factors, by strengthening 
ties with positive family or community role models, for 
example.
The 21st century juvenile justice system must be  
constructed around the principles of a system of care. The 
system of care concept first emerged in the mental health 
field and recently has expanded to include other human 
services. It is based on the concept that the best services 
are those that are delivered at the community level and 
are coordinated through case management. Systems of 
care utilize an array of interventions offered through an 
assortment of service providers. Like any human-service 
field, juvenile justice clients have multiple needs and  
issues that necessitate intervention. Rarely are the needs 
of clients addressed through one service provider. Instead, 
effective intervention requires the skills and resources of 
numerous agencies and professionals. In other instances, 
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services are best offered through nonprofessional agents 
who reside within the youth’s community (California 
Institute for Mental Health, 1998;  U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2001; Berkeley Center for 
Criminal Justice, 2010).
Under a traditional service-delivery system, services and 
resources often are restricted by administrative or cat-
egorical funding barriers. Under these situations, services 
to youth are restricted to those that are provided by an  
assigned agency. For example, juvenile justice system 
youth may be denied access to mental health services 
because they are not under the jurisdiction of the county 
mental health agency. These bureaucratic barriers often 
result in denial of services or poor coordination between 
different service providers (California Institute for  
Mental Health, 1998;  U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2001; Berkeley Center for Criminal 
Justice, 2010).
Elements of a Modern System
A juvenile justice system of care should be built around 
the following elements:
1. SerViceS SHoULd focUS on SPeciaL-needS 
YoUtH
Since most youth will age out of the juvenile justice 
system with minimal or no intervention past their 18th 
birthday, expending resources on first-time or low-level 
offenders should be discouraged. Instead, services should 
primarily target the highest-needs youth, particularly 
those with behavioral health issues and extended histories 
of system involvement.
2. reformS mUSt redUce inStitUtionaLization
For nearly 200 years, the American juvenile justice system 
has relied on congregate institutional care as a primary 
intervention. However, effective systems use institutional 
care only as a last resort and instead rely heavily on  
developing a rich array of community-based and/or  
non-institutional intervention strategies.
3. commUnitY-baSed interVentionS SHoULd be 
Prioritized
Community-based services are primarily delivered in the 
youth’s home and neighborhood. The focus of effective 
community-based services is to develop or enhance  
adequate support systems for youth and their families,  
addressing the full constellation of factors that contribute 
to delinquency. To ensure services are community-based 
and varied, juvenile justice systems need to develop 
service partnerships with communities and community-
based nonprofit agencies. Every community possesses 
assets, many of which often are underutilized by the 
juvenile justice system.
4. SerViceS SHoULd be cULtUraLLY comPetent
California is an increasingly diverse state, which contrib-
utes to the challenges of providing appropriate services. 
In a multicultural state with people sometimes clustered 
in ethnic communities, American legal practices are not 
always understood. Youth from these communities often 
are estranged from their immigrant working parents. 
In these situations, parents need direction in order to 
provide adequate support to their children. Focusing 
the primary intervention on the child’s behavior misses 
the need to impact the entire family unit. Impacting the 
family unit requires cultural sensitivity and, very often, 
language skills. Since many juvenile justice systems are 
not set up to provide these services, community resources 
need to be employed or developed.
5. SerViceS mUSt be offered aS Part of a  
coordinated continUUm
Most juvenile justice systems have little experience at 
forging comprehensive community partnerships that act 
in unison to deliver services. Instead, in instances where 
community-based services are employed by juvenile 
justice systems, they sometimes operate in a fragmented 
manner. While multi-disciplinary teams have evolved in 
recent years to promote more coordinated decision  
making, juvenile justice services still tend to be  
fragmented and poorly coordinated.
Juvenile justice system service coordination is further 
hampered by the traditional probation casework approach 
to services, in which decisions are left to individual  
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probation officers. Under this approach, referrals to com-
munity services often are dependent on the temperament 
and personal philosophy of the individual case-carrying  
probation officer. In many departments, there is little 
exercise of a centralized triage or case-planning process.
When youth are referred to services, often systematic 
methods for evaluating the quality of the program or the 
services delivered are lacking. Each program and service 
simply performs an isolated function with limited  
coordination or contact with other services.
An effective system of care operates using centralized  
decision making, where treatment is based on a  
systematic method for assessing individual needs and 
determining the appropriate array of services. Such a  
system provides uniform and equitable services to all 
youth. Service selection is not dependent on one  
individual.
In a coordinated continuum, youth have access to an  
array of services that are defined in an individualized  
service plan. The individually tailored service plan  
outlines the services that have been designated for each 
youth through a multi-disciplinary case-planning system. 
The plan is implemented and monitored by a designated 
case manager who is responsible for ensuring that the  
services are being delivered in a coordinated manner. 
Such a system properly defines everyone’s role and  
prevents overlap.
When utilizing a coordinated continuum, a youth who 
begins in the more restrictive end of the continuum, such 
as a secure facility, can move to a less restrictive end of 
the continuum as they progress in treatment. The youth 
is monitored at each stage. Should the youth relapse, he 
or she can be moved to the more restrictive setting until 
behavior improves and he or she can return to a less  
restrictive setting. In this type of structure, all compo-
nents of the continuum are tightly linked and dependent 
on the youth’s progress. Continuums of care for high-needs 
youth require a flexible decision-making structure that is 
based on treatment progress at each stage, rather than a 
defined commitment period.
6. SerVice deLiVerY SHoULd adoPt an  
UnconditionaL commitment
In constructing new service-delivery systems, juvenile 
justice systems must relinquish the practice of allow-
ing programs and services to reject youth based on their 
behavioral problems or offenses. Programs within the 
juvenile justice system often restrict service referrals based 
on risk factors or perceptions that the youth likely will 
fail in treatment. Such a process is known in the human-
service field as “creaming,” where youth likely to succeed are 
given preference for treatment. This desire to serve the most 
malleable youth is often driven by contract objectives 
that mandate successful outcomes, or simply an agency-
wide fear of handling more-challenging youth. In systems 
where youth most likely to succeed are given preference 
Coordinating Case Management
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for treatment, there is a tendency among service providers 
to exclude youth who present management problems. 
Policies that allow service providers to exclude or quickly 
eject youth who present behavioral issues are rejecting 
the needs of the highest-risk and most-needy youth, a 
practice that is not in the public’s interest.
The principle of unconditional care states that once a 
youth is assigned to a program, the program adopts an 
unconditional commitment to the child and will not eject 
the child solely based on behavior. Agencies that adopt an 
unconditional commitment approach take the position 
that in the role of in loco parentis the child is assumed to 
be a family member. While this approach does not mean 
that all behavior is acceptable and not subject to sanctions 
and consequences, it does mean that the program will 
continue to offer services to the youth for as long as the 
youth is subject to juvenile court jurisdiction.
Unconditional care is particularly relevant to the large 
segment of the juvenile offender population who were 
victims of childhood abuse and neglect. Many of these 
youth have faced years of placement in the foster care 
system, where they were placed in many foster homes.  
The experience of the foster care system for many youth 
is traumatizing, as they are shuttled from one placement 
to the next without ever having the opportunity to  
develop bonds of trust or affection with responsible 
adults. When these youth end up in the delinquency 
system, they are distrustful and alienated following years 
of physical and emotional rejection.
Unconditional care was designed to interrupt the cycle  
of abuse and rejection, by having programs maintain a  
commitment to the individual child akin to that of a 
responsible parent. If youth display poor behavior or 
commit a serious act, they may be temporarily removed 
from the setting, but are quickly reinstated as soon as 
their behavior is stabilized.
County juvenile justice systems can promote uncondi-
tional care through contractual arrangements with service 
providers. Contracted agencies should be given flexible 
funding to adapt services based on the needs of the youth, 
rather than the traditional requirement that youth adapt 
to the program modality. If youth must be temporarily 
removed from the program, every effort should be made 
to return them as soon as feasible. For challenging youth 
the program must be able to adjust the intensity of service 
to meet the needs of the youth.
California county juvenile justice systems must develop 
service models and contract mandates that ensure service 
providers give preference to the highest-needs youth. 
Foundation support could be vital to ensuring that  
standards of unconditional care be developed and are  
applicable throughout the state, and not subject to 
arbitrary jurisdictional definitions or fleeting practice 
standards.
7. SerViceS SHoULd incLUde fLexibLe fUndinG
Throughout the history of the juvenile justice system, 
services to youth were determined by pre-existing con-
tracts that defined the type of service. Most of the services 
offered by county juvenile justice systems are dictated by 
their funding streams. For example, institutional care, 
such as juvenile halls and county ranches, are funded 
Conditional Care 
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through county general funds. Counties rigorously define 
how these monies are to be spent by detailing the specific 
services and staffing levels. Once authorized by the local 
legislative body in the yearly county budget, juvenile 
justice administrators have little flexibility in how the  
allocated funds are spent.
In addition, group-home care funding, which is the most 
common alternative to institutional care employed by 
county juvenile justice systems, is determined by federal 
and state mandates. For example, group-home funding 
requirements are defined in Federal Title IV-E, which  
defines payment structures and requirements for residen-
tial care placements. The federal government has strict 
guidelines that clearly define residential placement and 
how monies are to be expended. While such rigid funding 
guidelines ensure that monies are properly accounted for 
and easily tracked, these categorical funding streams also 
inhibit the use of innovative nonresidential programming. 
Currently, many youth are committed to institutions or 
residential placement 
not because of a  
primary service need, 
but because of the 
absence of intensive 
community-based 
services.
Improving the capac-
ity of juvenile justice 
systems in California 
requires continued 
efforts to reduce  
categorical funding 
and increase flexible 
funding. Over the 
past 30 years, new concepts such as wraparound services 
have revolutionized the potential development of new 
and creative community-based services by diverting  
categorical residential funding streams toward nonresi-
dential alternatives. The recently implemented  
wraparound re-entry program established by CJCJ  
and Seneca Center in San Francisco offers such a model. 
In addition, the Santa Cruz County Probation Depart-
ment implemented its own wraparound program  
specifically for youth in the juvenile justice system.
Flexible funding is the key to expanding the range of 
traditional and nontraditional services available in the 
juvenile justice system. Services should not be predeter-
mined solely on the basis of yearly budgetary allocations 
for specific programs. Juvenile justice agencies must be 
provided with a pool of non-allocated funding that can be 
expended on individual youth as their needs dictate.
8. SerViceS SHoULd be ProPerLY eVaLUated
In recent years the term evidence-based practice has  
become a frequently used phrase in the human-service 
field. While it often denotes a number of meanings, it 
generally refers to the application of sound evaluation 
techniques to measure the effectiveness of services and 
treatment modalities. Effective juvenile justice systems 
need to develop the capacity to evaluate the overall  
performance of the system and individual performance  
of specific programs. In addition, the county juvenile 
court and probation departments will need to develop a 
comprehensive management information system that  
collates and analyzes various pieces of information related 
to system performance.
Evaluation of individual programs and agencies is  
done on a case-by-case basis to determine the quality  
of the particular service, and to analyze the impact on  
the overall system. A current example using a multi- 
dimensional evaluation system is the San Francisco  
Juvenile Collaborative Reentry Team (JCRT), which is a 
joint project of CJCJ, the San Francisco Juvenile Proba-
tion Department, the San Francisco Public Defender’s 
Office and the Superior Court. The initiative’s overall 
evaluation has been designed by the Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) consultants, 
while CJCJ’s performance is being individually evaluated 
by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
(NCCD).
 
 
         
Currently, many youth 
are committed to institu-
tions or residential  
placement not because of 
a primary service need, 
but because of the absence 
of intensive community-
based services.
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A note of caution: Evidence-based practice often is 
interpreted to mean the utilization of programs that have 
been evaluated and proven to work in other jurisdictions. 
When programs are found to have good evaluations they 
often are referred to as “best practice.” Many programs 
now market themselves as “best practice,” and while CJCJ 
does not question the efficacy of these models, CJCJ 
urges caution when simply selecting programs established 
in other places for replication. Inviting large outside 
service providers with no attachment to a community or 
jurisdiction to establish new program services can end up 
costing the jurisdiction more than services provided by 
local agencies. CJCJ advises that when best practices are 
considered for replication, counties designate local  
agencies for the task and utilize the large out-of-county 
service providers as short-term consultants that can 
support agencies in the start-up phase. In most cases, 
program models are readily available and can easily  
be adapted and designed to the specific needs of the  
jurisdiction.
Evidence-based Practices in the  
Criminal Justice System
1. Ability to assess actual risk/needs
2. Ability to enhance intrinsic motivation
3. Ability to target interventions, based on:
 a. Risk Principle: Prioritize supervision and treat-  
  ment resources for higher-risk offenders
 b. Needs Principle: Target interventions to  
  criminogenic needs
 c. Responsivity Principle: Be responsive to  
  temperament, learning style, motivation, culture  
  and gender when assigning programs
	 d.	 Dosage:	Structure	40-70%	of	high-risk	offenders’		
  time for three to nine months
 e. Treatment: Integrate treatment into the full  
	 	 sentence/sanctions	requirements
4. Ability to train in proper practice
5. Ability to increase positive reinforcement
6.	 Ability	to	engage	in	ongoing	support	in	clients’	 
 communities
7. Ability to measure relevant processes/practices
8. Ability to provide measurement and feedback
     Source: United States Department of Justice, 2007
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A vital part of juvenile justice reform is the 
full efficient utilization of available resources 
and funding. The use of Medicaid mental 
health services, specifically Early and Peri-
odic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment 
(EPSDT) services, offers youth in the juvenile 
justice system a broad range of services. 
Wraparound funding, another vital part of a 
comprehensive county-level juvenile justice 
system, allows for flexible funding to be  
used to provide nonresidential services for 
youth who would otherwise be sent to  
group homes.
restructurIng calIfornIa juvenIle justIce  services 
requires redirecting existing resources and utilizing new or underuti-
lized funding streams. The prospect of redirecting existing funding is 
problematic in times of fiscal austerity. It is during these periods that 
many public agencies retrench and attempt to protect core agency 
functions and existing staffing patterns while waiting for better fiscal 
times. However, difficult economic times also can provide the impetus 
to rethink past practices and develop innovative approaches that  
heretofore were not considered.
Utilizing Medicaid Funding
One of the most effective ways for counties to build a system of care is 
through the maximization of Medicaid-funded mental health services. 
The child health component of Medicaid is the Early and Periodic 
Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) program, which is 
among the most underutilized resources in the juvenile justice system. 
EPSDT funding can support a broad range of services for youth with 
behavioral health issues, including detention alternatives and re-entry 
services. Because research shows that nearly 70% of youth in the  
juvenile justice system have a diagnosable mental health need and 20% 
of these youth are seriously mentally ill, and because these reports  
     s e c t I o n  v I
Implementing Juvenile Justice Reform 
in California: First Steps
Section Vi includes research on the following topics:
• Services offered through EPSDT include individual and group therapy, 
mental health assessments and services, and clinical case manage-
ment. The state and federal government assume up to 95% of all 
EPSDT costs.
• Wraparound-funded slots are provided to counties by the state with 
the provision that program costs must either be cost neutral or less 
than the cost of out-of-home placement.
• Other funding streams include Juvenile Justice and Crime Prevention 
Act (JJCPA) funding, Youthful Offender Block Grants (YOBG) and  
Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding (JPCF).
• When secure facilities are needed, use smaller facilities that offer  
comprehensive services. The State of Missouri is leading the  
movement toward smaller rehabilitative models of juvenile facilities.
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historically have been underdiagnosed, juvenile justice 
systems must develop their capacity to expand these  
services (Koppelman, 2005).
EPSDT is federally funded through the Medicaid  
program. Medicaid funding, known as Medi-Cal in  
California, is a shared federal and state entitlement  
program designed to provide an assortment of health 
services to children and youth. EPSDT is the component 
of Medi-Cal that is designed to help children with severe 
emotional and mental health needs. When a child is 
made a ward of the court and custody is removed from 
the parent, in most circumstances the child automatically 
becomes Medi-Cal eligible.
EPSDT services usually are administered by county  
public mental health departments, which determine eligi-
bility, deliver services and monitor payments. The services 
typically offered through EPSDT include individual and 
group therapy, rehabilitation and mental health services, 
and case management. The level of service in many  
situations far exceeds what can be offered through con-
ventional probation casework. Services must be delivered 
or directly supervised by trained, licensed professionals 
and must adhere to strict professional standards.
Service standards are strict and subject to periodic audits 
by federal authorities. EPSDT service providers must 
maintain meticulous documentation of all the services 
provided. Many juvenile justice jurisdictions have been 
slow to utilize this potential funding stream because of 
the strict monitoring and the need to rigorously adhere 
to behavioral health-oriented principles. In addition, 
because EPSDT is administered by public mental health 
departments rather than probation systems, maximizing 
such services is inhibited by jurisdictional barriers.
In recent years, organizational barriers to maximizing 
EPSDT services have begun to weaken as more and more 
probation departments have recognized the potential 
boon to current services. In San Francisco, the Juvenile 
Probation Department has partnered with the Depart-
ment of Public Health, the Department of Children 
Youth and Families, and the Center on Juvenile and 
Criminal Justice to create an assortment of re-entry  
services for youth in out-of-home placement. By  
utilizing EPSDT case management and clinical services, 
EPSDT Funding
Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, 
and Treatment
This	benefit	has	been	a	required	part	of	Medicaid	 
funding since 1966, and was expanded by the federal 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA	‘89). 
Under	this	act,	all	EPSDT-funded	programs	were	 
required	to	provide	treatment	and	diagnosis	for	Med-
icaid recipients up to age 21, to “correct or ameliorate 
defects, physical and mental illnesses, and conditions 
discovered by screening services, whether or not such 
services were covered under the Medicaid State Plan.” 
A 1993 lawsuit against the state Department of Health 
Services	(DHS)	served	to	further	expand	the	availability	
of State General Funds to finance Medi-Cal specialty 
mental health services provided to eligible children and 
adolescents. In compliance with the lawsuit, as well  
as a 1997-98 federal waiver, DHS recognized county 
mental health departments as the main provider for  
expanded mental health benefits under EPSDT.  
Medi-Cal specialty mental health services are funded 
with a mix of federal, state and county funds.
Recipients eligible for EPSDT-funded programs are 
children from birth to age 21 who meet Medicaid  
income	eligibility	requirements,	and	the	Medi-Cal	 
medical necessity criteria for this age group. In order  
to	qualify	for	Medi-Cal	medical	necessity,	children	 
generally need to have a recognized developmental 
delay or mental disorder with identified interventions 
that	can	help	mitigate	the	child’s	problems.	
major ePSdt mental Health Services include:
•	 Rehabilitation
•	 Collateral	contact
•	 Mental	health	services
•	 Intensive	day	treatment
•	 Mental	health	assessment
•	 Targeted	case	management
•	 Medication	support	services
•	 Therapeutic	behavioral	services
•	 Crisis	intervention/stabilization
Source: California Alliance of Children and Family Services (2010).
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the department now can offer a higher level of intensive 
case management and family interventions to youth 
returning to the community from group home or county 
ranch and camp placements. The program allows mental 
health services to be delivered in the youth’s home, rather 
than requiring the youth to travel to a therapist’s office.
The best part of EPSDT from a county perspective is 
that the county only assumes responsibility for 5% of 
the costs, while the state and federal government pay the 
remaining 95%. EPSDT is among the most underutilized 
funding streams in the California juvenile justice system. 
While many county juvenile justice systems have  
begun using EPSDT services, their full and broader 
application is still evolving. Tradition-bound probation 
departments sometimes are reluctant to use behavioral 
health services for high-needs youth in the community 
because of historical practices and administrative barriers. 
Regardless of the reason, the maximum development of 
EPSDT services is essential to a modern probation  
department, as it offers a new and expanded funding 
stream for community-based services. It also broadens the 
ability to effectively and comprehensively intervene with 
the high percentage of juvenile justice youth who suffer 
from behavioral health issues.
Wraparound Services
One of the biggest innovations in the human service field 
over the last 25 years was the development of wraparound 
services. The concept evolved from the recognized failings 
of reliance on residential services and the inability to  
redirect funding to nonresidential services. The inability 
to redirect categorical funding streams away from residen-
tial placement resulted in large numbers of youth being 
committed to out-of-home placement who could have 
been served in the community, had the resources been 
made available. These funding streams were the result of 
federal and state foster care laws that created categorical 
funding for residential placement. Since group-home 
placement through the juvenile court is subject to these 
federal foster care funding restrictions, counties are obli-
gated to follow the federal guidelines.
In the mid-1990s, California counties began experiment-
ing with the new concept of wraparound funding. Desig-
nated pilot counties were given authority by the state to 
Wraparound Funding
Wraparound was established in California under 
Senate	Bill	(SB)	163	(Chapter	795,	Statutes	of	
1997),	which	allows	California	counties	to	develop	
the Wraparound Model using state and county Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children–Foster Care 
(AFDC-FC)	dollars.	This	legislation	permits	coun-
ties to use the wraparound funding for planning and 
services delivery instead of use for placements of 
children/youth	in	high-end	group	homes	(Rate	Clas-
sification	Level	(RCL)	12-14).	The	purpose	of	the	bill	
is to return children and youth in group-home care 
to their homes and communities or help children at 
imminent risk of placement in high-end group homes 
to remain in their homes. In January 2001, Assembly 
Bill	(AB)	2706	extended	the	wraparound	process	and	
service to children who were placed in lower-level 
group	homes	of	a	RCL	10-11	or	at	risk	of	placement	
at this level. 
Sb 163 legislation requires wraparound  
services to: 
•	 Be	family-centered,	individualized,	culturally	 
 relevant and strength-based
•	 Be	team-	and	community-based
•	Rely	on	natural	community	supports,	develop	a		
 child and family team plan to identify service needs
•	 Place	child	in	the	least-restrictive	environment
•	 Track	and	evaluate	outcomes
•	Be	cost	neutral	to	the	state
•	 Reinvest	cost	savings	into	child	welfare	programs
The wraparound process can eliminate barriers to  
service delivery by creating a cohesive spectrum of 
family, community and services.
Wraparound	funding	is	tied	to	the	RCL	classifica-
tion of a youth, and must be cost neutral to the state 
when compared with a group-home placement.  
Of the 58 counties in California, 31 have active 
wraparound programs. The Mental Health Services 
Act	(MHSA)	of	2005	(Prop	63)	includes	a	very	specific	
requirement	that	all	counties	must	develop	a	 
wraparound program for children and their families 
unless specified conditions are met.
Source: California Department of Social Services (2010).
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Wraparound Case Example
DERRICk	W.	IS	A	17-YEAR-OLD	YOUTH	FROM	SAN	FRANCISCO who was returning home following a group-home 
placement, where he was finally committed after a string of arrests that included firearm possession and robbery. Derrick 
had a turbulent childhood, where he grew up in a conflict-filled home, where his parents frequently fought and argued until 
their divorce.
In addition to problems at home, Derrick endured the violent deaths of his brother and two 
good friends. When he later was arrested and confined in the San Francisco juvenile hall, he 
was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). When he was committed to a 
group home, Derrick exhibited poor adjustment, as he became hyper-vigilant and reactive to 
the other youth with whom he lived. In one instance, he developed a conflict with another San 
Francisco youth, who promised to retaliate against Derrick once they were back in the city.
When Derrick was finally released from the group home, he was assigned to CJCJ’s new 
Wraparound program for youth returning to the community following group-home placement. 
Derrick initially was placed in the home of his grandmother and father in a high-crime area of 
San Francisco. Unfortunately, the youth with whom he had been in conflict also resided in the 
same neighborhood.
Initially, Derrick was doing well with CJCJ case management support and individual therapy, until he began receiving 
threats from other neighborhood youths. CJCJ immediately arranged to transfer residency to his mother in Emeryville  
to remove him from the city. A CJCJ case manager and therapist worked with Derrick and his mother to ameliorate  
lingering family issues that first needed to be resolved. Once therapy was initiated, Derrick’s residency was transferred to 
his mother’s home. After the transfer to Emeryville, Derrick initially did well in his new environment. He attended school, 
obtained good grades, participated in therapy and played football. CJCJ provided him with transportation, so he could 
continue to visit his grandmother and father in San Francisco, along with providing ongoing home-based family therapy. 
Unfortunately, one night while visiting his father’s home and riding in his uncle’s car, he was stopped by San Francisco 
police, who were aware that Derrick was on probation. During the routine search of the car, a loaded firearm was found in 
his backpack, which Derrick said he carried for protection. He was arrested and taken to the juvenile hall where he faced 
possible commitment to a state correctional institution.
While he was awaiting adjudication and disposition, CJCJ continued to work on his case. Through discussions with  
Derrick and his parents, we learned of an adult cousin who lived in Newport Beach, California. The cousin was a success-
ful business owner who was involved in community youth issues as a member of 100 Black Men. After numerous  
discussions and negotiations between Derrick’s estranged parents and his cousin, CJCJ was able to arrange for him  
to move to his cousin’s Newport Beach home. The new arrangement offered a respite from conflict and violence and  
provided a new start where he could focus on school and sports.
Using wraparound support services, CJCJ was able to arrange for Derrick to obtain therapy, attend school and play  
football in Newport Beach. This year he is completing his senior year and is a star high school football player. He currently 
is being recruited by division-one football programs, including UCLA.
Had the Wraparound program not existed, it is likely Derrick would have been committed to a correctional institution, 
where he eventually would have been returned home to his previous circumstances with little prospect of future  
success. The resources provided by the Wraparound program gave us the ability to provide a level of intensive  
services that was necessary to address the multiple family and community issues that had impeded his chances for  
a productive life.
The wraparound  
process can eliminate 
barriers to service 
delivery by creating a 
cohesive spectrum of 
family, community  
and services.
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Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act 
In 2000, the California legislature passed Assembly 
Bill 1913, the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act  
(JJCPA),	which	“supports	community-based	 
programs that have proved effective in reducing 
crime	and	delinquency	among	at-risk	youth	and	
young offenders.” In effect, the intent of this  
legislation was to create a stable funding base for 
rehabilitative programs for youth in the state,  
representing a shift in focus for juvenile justice  
in California.
The act mandates the oversight of JJCPA funding 
by a local Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council 
(JJCC),	headed	by	the	chief	probation	officer	and	
comprised of specified members, including repre-
sentatives of law enforcement and criminal justice 
agencies, the board of supervisors, social services, 
education, mental health and community-based 
organizations. It also mandates the formulation of  
a local action plan to assess existing juvenile  
services and to fill gaps in that service. The funding 
is administered by the Corrections Standards Au-
thority	(CSA).	Once	authorized,	the	state	Controller’s	
Office releases funding to participating counties, 
which must report back program outcomes for six 
mandated measures, as well as expenditure data.
Source: California Board of Corrections (2004).
test the application of flexible funding to the provision  
of nonresidential services for youth who would otherwise 
be sent to group homes. Because of the promising results 
produced by these pilot counties, the state expanded the 
practice statewide with the goal of reducing the high 
number of youth in residential placement. Under the 
arrangement, the state’s Department of Social Services 
allowed counties to redirect group-home funding to 
nonresidential services. Currently, the state allots a small 
number of wraparound slots per county with the stipu-
lation that the program must either reduce cost or be 
cost neutral. Since group-home care is the most expen-
sive option available to county juvenile justice systems, 
redirecting those funds to create a comprehensive array 
of nonresidential services reduces the need to remove a 
youth from his or her home or community.
Wraparound provides a vehicle for unprecedented  
flexibility in the funding of new or nontraditional indi-
vidualized interventions, since the wraparound service 
provider often is given the same amount of money as a 
youth assigned to the most expensive group home.  
Additionally, most youth receiving wraparound services 
also receive EPSDT services. As a result, per capita 
combined monthly wraparound and EPSDT funding can 
exceed $6,000. Since some of these flexible wraparound 
funds are not expended in every single case, the expecta-
tion is that wraparound service providers will pool surplus 
or unspent funds to reinvest monies from lower-needs 
youth to address the higher-needs youth.
Presently, most counties contract their wraparound  
services to nonprofit service providers. There are a  
number of agencies around the state that can provide 
expertise in the development of wraparound programs. 
For counties with little experience in developing wrap-
around services, these agencies can offer assistance during 
the start-up phase.
Despite the promise offered by wraparound services for 
revolutionizing the range of individualized community-
based and nonresidential services, its use among juvenile 
justice system youth is limited. While some counties, 
such as San Francisco, Santa Cruz and Humboldt, are 
pioneering the use of wraparound for juvenile justice 
system-involved youth, most counties reserve their 
wraparound slots for only or predominantly child welfare 
youth. Few other service options exist that offer the  
juvenile justice system a greater opportunity to develop  
a pool of flexible funding to create individualized  
interventions.
Other Major Funding Streams Available 
to County Probation Departments
Along with EPSDT Medi-Cal funding and wraparound 
funding, several other major state funding streams were 
developed over the past 10 years to expand county-based 
juvenile justice services. These funding streams represent 
three separate statewide juvenile justice initiatives, begin-
ning with passage of the Juvenile Justice and Crime 
Prevention Act of 2000 (JJCPA). The purpose of the 
JJCPA was to serve as a revenue stream to help counties 
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improve the overall range of juvenile justice services. This 
state revenue source was further supplemented by the 
Juvenile Probation and Camps Program that was designed 
to improve the operational capacity of probation  
departments.
The Youthful Offender Block Grant (YOBG) was estab-
lished through Senate Bill 81 in August 2007 to provide 
counties with the means to develop an array of new 
services to handle youth they no longer could commit to 
state-run youth correctional institutions. Together these 
funding sources amount to more than $380 million of 
funding to local juvenile justice systems. These funds 
have played a key role in promoting changes at the 
county level, by providing funding for non-institutional 
services. Despite the state’s current economic crisis, the 
state legislature and governor have protected these funds. 
Currently, none of these funding streams are facing cuts 
in this fiscal year.
In addition to these three funding streams, the state  
legislature and former Gov. Schwarzenegger agreed to 
transfer all parole services presently provided by DJJ to 
county probation departments. Implemented on Jan. 28, 
2011, county probation departments are now given up 
to $15,000 per parolee to assume post-release supervision 
responsibility. This legislation represents a further step  
toward realigning all juvenile justice services to the  
counties and increasing the need to improve the quality 
and scope of probation services.
While many of these funds have been allocated by the 
counties for existing services, these funds could be  
creatively employed to provide a match for EPSDT  
services in smaller counties to further augment services.
Secure Care
One of the most controversial areas of the California  
juvenile justice system is the continuing reliance on 
congregate institutions. Since first introduced to the state 
in the 1850s, congregate institutional care in the juvenile 
justice system has had a bleak and sordid history that  
includes inhumane treatment in violence-riddled  
facilities. Presently, the state’s youth corrections system 
and numerous county probation systems, including Los 
Angeles, are in the midst of lawsuits alleging abusive  
institutional conditions. In the case of the Farrell lawsuit, 
the state has fully acknowledged its failure to provide 
humane living conditions.8 
Congregate care in 
California’s county 
juvenile justice 
systems ranges from 
custodial-oriented 
institutions to thera-
peutically oriented 
residential group 
homes. Custodial-
oriented institutions 
tend to be operated 
by county proba-
tion departments, juvenile halls and county ranches and 
camps. These facilities tend to be characterized by high 
levels of regimentation designed to maintain and enforce 
orderly control. While designs tend to vary depending on 
the age of the institutions, California juvenile halls built 
within the past 20 years are high-security facilities where 
youth typically are confined in housing units with 15-25 
cells. In contrast, county ranches and camps tend to  
follow the traditional medium-security training school 
model with large open dormitory living units and  
standardized daily schedules. Education programs and  
resources often are insufficient to address the complex  
educational needs of the delinquent population, and 
mental health services often are underfunded and  
inadequate.
To meet the demands of the 21st century, the tradi-
tional institutional design of county facilities will need 
to be reconsidered. Open dormitory housing units that 
emphasize custodial care should be abolished in favor 
of smaller, more therapeutically oriented living units. 
In these smaller living units, youth feel safe and positive 
interaction between youth and staff is promoted. Many 
county probation systems in California are now looking 
toward the state of Missouri for better models of institu-
tional care that are therapeutically oriented and provide 
congregate care
Congregate care in youth 
corrections generally refers to 
institutions that house large 
numbers of youth in highly 
regimented and impersonal 
facilities. Congregate care insti-
tutions tend to be more  
custodial in their approach to  
managing their residents.
8 For complete information on the Farrell litigation, the consequent consent decree  
and related items, see the Prison Law Office web site juvenile facilities page at  
http://www.prisonlaw.com/cases.php#juvi
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Youthful Offender Block Grant 
Welfare	and	Institutions	Code	Section	1951	requires	
that counties spend Youthful Offender Block Grant 
(YOBG)	funds	to	“enhance	capacity	of	county	
probation, mental health, drug and alcohol, and 
other county departments to provide appropriate 
rehabilitative and supervision services to youthful 
offenders subject to [the Act].” The YOBG statute 
was designed to give counties tremendous flex-
ibility in determining how best to support programs, 
placements, services and strategies. Counties are 
required	to	monitor	their	expenditures	to	ensure	
consistency with the statute.
By	May	1	of	each	year	(beginning	in	2010),	 
counties must submit a Juvenile Justice Develop-
ment	Plan	(JJDP)	to	the	Corrections	Standards	
Authority	(CSA)	that	outlines	their	anticipated	
programs and expenditures for the upcoming fiscal 
year.	By	Oct.	1	of	each	year	(beginning	in	2010),	
counties must submit a report to CSA that includes 
actual expenditures for the previous fiscal year,  
as well as program performance outcomes for  
that year.
Corrections Standards Authority (2010).
an extensive community aftercare. A certain percentage  
of youth who come into the juvenile justice system  
require secure care because they have demonstrated a  
level of aggression that renders them too high a risk for 
immediate return to the community. However, secure 
care should be reserved for only the percentage of youth 
who cannot be managed in a less-secure environment. 
Too often youth are committed to secure institutions for  
bureaucratic convenience or necessity rather than  
public protection.
Secure-custody facilities must be designed to offer a  
therapeutic environment, where troubled youth can be 
treated in a safe environment. Rehabilitation cannot 
occur in an environment where a youth does not feel 
safe and lives in constant fear of assault and exploitation. 
Reducing rates of violence in an institutional setting is 
dependent on a low youth-to-staff ratio where living units 
hold no more than 10 to 15 youth. Facilities with larger 
The two photographs above represent a common California  
juvenile hall cell and cell block. Note the contrast of the  
photograph of a typical Missouri facility, where youth reside in 
comfortable nonprison-like conditions, where interaction between 
youth and staff is encouraged and a full range of educational and 
rehabilitative services are provided.
Missouri Hills Dormitory
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living units foster a prison subculture simply by the  
number of relationships that can develop as the living 
unit population rises. The table above delineates the 
number of potential relationships that develop as the 
institutional populations rise. Violence in a correctional 
institution is partly a function of population. Past stud-
ies, including those conducted by the former California 
Youth Authority, showed that violence decreased as  
living-unit size decreased. A lower population impacts  
the ease in which staff are able to control and supervise  
the relationships between youth (Ohlin, Miller and 
Coates, 1978).
In their classic analysis on the impact of population size 
on youth correctional environments, Harvard researchers 
noted:
This rapid escalation of possible relationships as pro-
gram size increases soon makes it impossible for staff 
members to keep track of and have control over what 
is going on between each pair of program members. 
The likelihood then increases with program size that 
some of those relationships will make a youth’s experi-
ence in the program a disagreeable one (Ohlin, Miller 
and Coates, 1978, p. 37).
The high rates of violence in high-population California 
youth correctional facilities with large living units confirm 
this point. Since secure facilities in a juvenile justice  
system should be reserved for more aggressive youth,  
living units larger than 10 invite high rates of violence 
and the development of a prison-like subculture.
In response to this growing recognition, many California 
counties now are reconsidering conventional institutional 
practices in favor of more modern approaches, such as 
those pioneered in Missouri. The Missouri approach to 
secure care includes small living units with highly trained 
staff. In these facilities, youth have the benefit of easy  
access to quality education, counseling, programmed  
recreation, family therapy, vocational training and  
aftercare. Institutional programming is not compartmen-
talized and subdivided; instead, all elements of the daily 
program are coordinated and directed by trained treat-
ment professionals. With a more favorable architectural 
design and proper professional staffing, violence and  
gang domination in facilities is nearly nonexistent.
Currently, the Santa Clara County Probation Depart-
ment, under the direction of Chief Sheila Mitchell, has 
nearly completed a full conversion of its James Ranch to 
a more therapeutic facility based on the Missouri model. 
San Francisco is also in the midst of converting its long-
criticized Log Cabin Ranch School into a Missouri-type 
facility under the leadership of Chief William Siffermann. 
In addition, Santa Cruz County, long viewed as a model 
county, has successfully maintained very low numbers in 
its juvenile hall by restricting detention to only those who 
pose a threat to public safety.
With the downsizing and closing of the state’s youth 
correctional system and its large congregate institutions, 
counties will need to develop permanent local options.  
In its 2008 report calling for the closure of the state’s 
youth correctional facilities, the state’s Little Hoover 
Commission called for the creation of regional facili-
ties. Under this proposal the counties would enter into 
agreements to use existing facilities in certain counties as 
regional facilities. Some facilities could be used to serve 
special populations, such as Humboldt County’s New 
Horizons, which currently serves youth with behavioral 
health issues.
Number	of	Living	
Unit	Residents
Possible Relationship 
Pairings
The relationship between living-unit  
populations and the development of  
institutional subcultures.
  
10 45
20 190
40 780
60 1770
80 3160
Institutional population increases multiplies the  
number of possible adverse relationships that  
contributes to institutional violence.
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Conclusion
countIes wIll need to create  viable systems of care that 
coordinate services across traditional agency boundaries. This  
requires mental health, social services, educational and juvenile justice 
agencies to work together in ways that they have not in the past. It 
also requires incorporating the local nonprofit community as a core 
element in a new service delivery system that is built on a coordinated 
continuum of community-based services. Unlike traditional static 
bureaucracies, nonprofit agencies offer a means to quickly implement 
new approaches with greater flexibility.
The first steps in achieving this service restructuring will involve 
maximizing the use of existing funding streams to target the high-end 
offenders, while reducing the use of congregate care institutions. With 
the continuing downsizing of the state’s Division of Juvenile Justice, 
counties will need to expand their ability to handle an older and more 
challenging type of delinquent. Under the SB 81 legislation, counties 
now can provide services to youth up to the age of 21. This broader 
age range confronts local juvenile justice systems with many chal-
lenges, but also presents an opportunity to enhance the likelihood 
of long-term success, since many youth in the juvenile justice system 
are graduates of the child welfare system and historically have had 
few options once state services terminated when they reached age 18. 
Funding options, such as EPSDT and wraparound, offer county  
juvenile justice systems an immediate opportunity to expand the 
range of community-based options for the highest-needs youth  
beyond the age of 18. Building county capacity to utilize these fund-
ing streams should be an immediate priority in any reform effort.
Finally, counties must expand their ability to form partnerships with 
neighboring jurisdictions to develop and/or better utilize secure 
custody facilities. With the expansion and renovation of juvenile 
halls and county ranches and camps over the past few years, coun-
ties are now better equipped to handle more serious delinquents 
than the state’s DJJ. These modern facilities are structurally capable 
of handling an older and sometimes more challenging delinquent 
population. Smaller counties can contract with larger counties to take 
California’s juvenile justice system is at  
a crossroads. With state and county  
governments confronting the worst fiscal 
crisis since the Great Depression, a major 
restructuring and prioritization of services  
is necessary. This fiscal crisis presents an  
opportunity to initiate reforms that are  
long overdue. Since the creation of the  
California juvenile court in 1903, the meth-
ods for delivering services have changed 
minimally. The system that evolved in 
California over the past 107 years involved 
reliance on an underfunded system of proba-
tion services and an ill-conceived system of 
congregate care institutions and residential 
facilities. The challenge of the 21st century 
is how to restructure county juvenile justice 
systems to truly achieve the original goal  
of rehabilitation through individualized  
interventions and services.
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advantage of their greater capacity and experience in 
handling a higher volume of older and more serious  
delinquents. Counties that have historically relied on 
state institutional commitments will need to modify 
existing practices to incorporate new approaches and 
changing realities. No longer should a youth in one 
county face a more severe disposition than a youth  
in another county simply because of differences in 
resources.
Achieving sweeping and balanced changes in Califor-
nia’s juvenile justice system will require the support 
of philanthropic foundations. However, foundation 
support should be focused toward ongoing technical 
assistance, planning and start-up funding, rather than 
ongoing direct service support. Programs and services 
should be permanently funded through a combination 
of federal, state and local resources. The juvenile justice 
service delivery system of the future will combine the 
efforts of multiple agencies and community organiza-
tions to ensure that youth receive the highest level of 
individualized care in a culturally competent manner. 
County juvenile justice systems and foundations should 
work to develop the resources that are available in the 
county. Assistance of agencies from outside the county 
can help in the development of specialized services 
that require a capacity to collect data and adhere to 
strict reporting mandates. When accessing outside 
assistance, counties should give preference to develop-
ing the capacity of indigenous resources and existing 
community-based organizations that have established 
ties to the communities they serve. Delivering juvenile 
justice services is complex and multifaceted and requires 
individuals familiar with and committed to the  
neighborhoods and youth they serve.
The California juvenile justice system is confronting the 
most fundamental challenges in its history. If history 
is an indicator, decisions that are made over the next 
few years will fundamentally determine the system’s 
structure for the rest of this century. It is therefore 
incumbent on all elements of the juvenile justice system 
and philanthropic community to foster meaningful and 
responsible change.
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